

An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus

A Map for the Future - 2011



CIVICUS: CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX REPORT FOR CYPRUS

An international action-research project coordinated by
CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation



The analysis and policy recommendations of this Report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme, its Executive Board or its Member States. The Report is the work of an independent team of authors supported by UNDP's peace building programme in Cyprus, Action for Cooperation and Trust.

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World Alliance for Citizen Participation

Conducted Jointly By:
The Management Centre of the Mediterranean and
the NGO Support Centre

FOREWORD

Civil society is pressured to take on more responsibilities in contemporary society. This is not a new phenomenon but an increasingly important one for a more just and equitable world. The nation state may not be withering away as yet; however it is fast maturing in some societies to a stage ready to transfer or share some of its social responsibilities with a more structured and organised civil society. A general finding of CIVICUS in the last series of Civil Society Index (CSI) studies, carried out in more than 50 countries between 2003 and 2006, was that civil society was most effective in a society where the state is also functioning well. This implies that societal progress can be facilitated when the state and civil society reach a point where they can establish a healthy relationship away from a detrimental confrontation based on a more constructive dialogue and complementary and cooperative partnership.

When we carried out the 2005 CSI study with the technical support of CIVICUS and financial support of UNDP-ACT in Cyprus, two of the dimensions that we used to establish the profile of civil society in both communities in Cyprus proved to be weak. These were the 'structure' and the 'impact' of civil society. Furthermore there were deficiencies in the areas of networking amongst civil society organisations (CSOs), multi-sector partnerships and adherence to a well designed code of conduct. The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, a Turkish Cypriot NGO and NGO Support Centre, a Greek Cypriot NGO, joined forces in order to help and support civil society deal with these weaknesses and support CSOs to become stronger and be able to engage more in policy-making as well as the peace building and reconciliation process on the island. Consequently the CSI study became a tool not only used for understanding and strengthening civil society in Cyprus but also one which helped develop a culture of cooperation and trust between the two communities, which unfortunately have been experiencing a state of long lasting conflict and an unresolved political problem.

We are truly pleased to be able to produce the second CSI report in Cyprus under the prevailing difficult political circumstances. Unlike other country reports, you will find that there are two sections of the Cyprus study, one for Greek Cypriot civil society and the other for Turkish Cypriot civil society. The encouraging part of this work was that the two research teams worked in harmony and produced a common country report. Even though it contains two sections, it also has a chapter that explores the commonalities and differences between the two reports. UNDP-ACT in Cyprus played a significant role, not just as a funder, but as a partner of the whole process, supporting the two teams in all aspects. In this report you will hopefully find some answers to questions in relation to the development and role of civil society and its general profile on the island.

We also trust that the report will provide an opportunity to make some comparisons between the two communities in Cyprus, and also with those other countries which implemented CSI in this round. Moreover, there is a good opportunity to see how civil society transformed in Cyprus since 2005 when we did the first study. For this comparison, please see the 2005 CSI report, at our websites www.ngo-sc.org and www.mc-med.eu.

Michalis Avraam
Chairman

Bulent Kanol
Chairman

NGO Support Centre

The Management Centre

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Work on the Civil Society Index research project was an intense and challenging process, which would not have been possible without cooperation and help from a broad range of organisations and individuals. We would particularly like to take this opportunity to thank all the Advisory Committee members listed in the Appendix. The report draws on ideas and arguments brought up during the meetings of the work of the Advisory Committee, who continued to give their input and support throughout the CSI process.

From the Turkish Cypriot Community (TCC), special thanks is given to some of these members who went beyond their Advisory Committee membership roles and actively supported and participated in our work at different stages. From the Turkish Cypriot Community these include Isilay Yilmaz (KAYAD), Emete İmge (Association of Patients Rights), Mustafa Abitoglu (CT Human Rights Foundation) and Dr Bekir Azgin (EMU).

From the Management Centre special gratitude must be expressed to the TCC Implementation Team. The report would not have been possible without the guidance of the Executive Director of the Management Centre and co-author Dr Bülent Kanol, the efforts of civil society expert and main author of the Turkish Cypriot report Dr Ömür Yılmaz, the Project Coordinator İzlem Sonmez and our research expert Muharrem Amcazade.

From the Greek Cypriot Community (GCC) special thanks is given to Joseph Bayada (Symfiliosis), Doros Michael (KISA), Yiannis Papadakis (University of Cyprus), Panayiota Xenophontos (Girl Guides), Charis Psaltis (University of Cyprus and the Association of Historical Dialogue and Research), Andreas Pavlikas (PEO), Katy Economidou (Hands Across the Divide), Nana Achilleos (NGO-SC and Hands Across the Divide), and Xenia Constantinou (European Youth Forum and Cyprus Youth Council). We are particularly grateful to Joseph Bayada for his thoughtful contributions and his reflections on the Cypriot context over many years.

From the NGO Support Centre, a special thank you goes to Lorraine Marriott, Project Manager for the CSI Study in the GCC for her contributions to the study and in coordinating all activities in the GCC, and to Nadia Karayianni who contributed both to the content and the coordination of the report and generously shared her wealth of experience of Cypriot life through a bi-communal lens. Finally, special thanks to Christos Zachariades from Argonauts Consulting for his extensive work throughout the project, his dedication in helping us achieve our aims and for working late into the evenings to help us achieve our deadlines.

Within this research project, we have interviewed a number of CSO representatives and we would also like to thank them for their time and willingness to engage with the project. This project was only possible with the firm support of UNDP-ACT in Cyprus which provided a grant from USAID to support this study and we are most grateful to both organisations for their encouragement and sponsorship. In particular, Stavroulla Georgiadou and Nilgun Arif representing UNDP-ACT in Cyprus were very supportive throughout the whole process

A number of CIVICUS staff members provided us with continuous support and guidance during the project implementation and we are grateful to them for their help: Natalie Akstein, Tracy Anderson, Mariano Dedonatis, Andrew Firmin, Olga Kononykhina, Megan MacGarry and Mark Nowotny.

The Management Centre
www.mc-med.eu

The NGO Support Centre
www.ngo-sc.org

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AC	Advisory Committee
CSI	Civil Society Index
CSO	Civil society organisation
EU	European Union
GC	Greek Cypriot
GC	Greek Cypriot Community
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
KTEZO	Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Shopkeepers and Artisans
KTMMOB	Union of the Chambers for Cyprus Turkish Engineers and Architects
KTSO	Cyprus Turkish Chamber of Industry
KTTO	Cyprus Chamber of Commerce
NGO	Non governmental organisation
NIT	National Implementation Team
PE	Political engagement
SE	Social engagement
TC	Turkish Cypriot
TCC	Turkish Cypriot Community
TMT	Turkish Defence Organisation
UHH	National People's Movement
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP-ACT	United Nations Development Programme
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Civil Society Index (CSI) is a participatory action-research project assessing the state of civil society. It has now been implemented in its different phases in over 70 countries around the world. The CSI is initiated and implemented by, and for, civil society organisations (CSOs) at the country level, in partnership with CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS). The CSI implementation actively involves and disseminates its findings to a broad range of stakeholders including civil society, government, the media, donors, academics and the public at large.

Due to the inter-communal conflict and the current division of the island, the CSI research was conducted separately in the Greek Cypriot Community and the Turkish Cypriot Community by two organisations working in parallel. Through periodic consultations and joint meetings, the comparability of the data was ensured, and a comparative chapter and a series of island-wide recommendations were developed in a bid to encourage civil society as an effective driving force for reconciliation.


The CSI methodology uses a combination of participatory and scientific research methods to generate an assessment of the state of civil society at the national level. The CSI measures the following core dimensions:

- 1) **Civic Engagement** – the extent to which individuals engage in social and politically based initiatives;
- 2) **Level of Organisation** – the degree of institutionalisation of civil society;
- 3) **Practice of Values** – the extent to which civil society promotes and practices some core values;
- 4) **Perceived Impact** – the extent to which civil society is able to impact on the social and policy arena, according to internal and external perceptions; and
- 5) **External Environment** – the socio-economic, political and cultural environment within which civil society operates.

These dimensions are expressed visually on the Civil Society Diamond, which gives a pictorial representation of the state of the civil society. The first four dimensions make up the four axes of the diamond. The circle around the diamond is the fifth dimension and represents the External Environment: the larger the circle, the more conducive the social, political, and economic environment is believed to be for the development and functioning of civil society (Loizos 2006; Lönnqvist 2008; Lordos 2005; Fröstörm 2008).

Greek Cypriot Community

Figure 1.1: Greek Cypriot Civil Society Diamond



Civil society in the GCC scores highest on the dimension of the Level of Organisation, which refers to the extent to which organised civil society as a whole has developed, including internal governance, infrastructure, communication and human, technological and financial resources. The score is lowest for the dimension of Civic Engagement, which describes the extent, depth and diversity of social and political interactions. Finally, the External Environment scores 77.1%, which is a reflection of the relatively healthy context for civil society to operate within.

The changes in civil society, as documented by the CSI survey, are apparent, and many CSO's are enjoying the benefits of formal management structures and new technological resources. But it must also be noted that not all organisations in the GCC have sufficient resources (personnel and financial) to be able to implement the kind of support mechanisms and infrastructure necessary to increase their capacity. Small grant programmes often support the introduction of these measures, and in recent years, the availability of small grants and technical assistance has supported many CSOs which would not otherwise have the opportunity to develop their internal capacities. However, the lack of diversity in funding, through opportunities including from the private sector or through the availability of micro finance means that civil society in the GCC still has a long way to develop.

In terms of the assessment of Civic Engagement, civil society has in recent years seen a vast array of new organisations develop, supporting marginalised groups who would not otherwise have been visible in society. The representation of groups such as the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual community (LGBT) is seen as a step change for the GCC, although many members of society still do not accept such people. In addition, civil society remains largely based in the capital, Nicosia, and as such it is important for stakeholders, including authorities and funders, to reach out and encourage more diversity in rural areas.


The research highlighted a number of actions which can be addressed to increase the effectiveness of civil society in the GCC. These include:

- Strengthening the legislation for CSOs in Cyprus, which will have a positive effect on their ability to contribute to change in society. The process is well underway and will help to stimulate further growth and effectiveness of CSOs.
- Greater dialogue between CSOs to monitor legal reform, and establishing a dialogue with policy makers, which will help to increase the visibility of CSOs and their participation in future related policy issues
- Promoting the role of civil society in rural areas to stimulate civic engagement and influence policy-making
- Efforts to strengthen the values of civil society in areas including volunteering, democratic culture, tolerance and diversity within the education system to lead to a more effective civil society
- Increase the availability of opportunities for capacity building support, particularly for those CSOs engaged in reconciliation activities
- Increase the accountability and transparency of CSOs, particularly those receiving public funding, and strengthen associations that promote diversity and tolerance
- Motivate individuals to become active members of CSOs, not only of traditional organisations such as sport associations, cultural groups and professional associations, but also of more progressive and newly developed associations
- Improve the overall impact of civil society in Cyprus by highlighting why a strong civil society is important, by presenting best practices from other countries and explaining what roles CSOs have in the European context in formulating policies and practices.

Over the past five years, the environment for civil society in the GCC has remained relatively strong and efforts to build on this have remained a priority for civil society. Legislation which will modernise the establishment, existence, internal governance, external supervision and termination of NGOs, and on their funding and fiscal treatment, is undergoing a review, in consultation with CSOs and the relevant authorities in the GCC. Civil society is pressing for specific changes in the law to allow CSOs to be eligible to bid for public funds on an equal footing with for-profit entities (including CyprusAid, funding which is not available to local organisations), particularly for those CSOs which attain the status of 'public benefit organisations'. Laws (including income tax law) relating to taxation of CSOs must be reviewed, with a view to establishing a system of taxation based upon activity rather than legal status, and as a principle, CSOs should be free to engage in economic activities, both in direct furtherance of their purposes and as a means of generating income. Through the implementation of such new measures, the environment in which civil society operates would be closer to that of more established European partners, thus creating the opportunity for civil society to thrive. These changes would also have a positive impact on the freedom for CSOs in the GCC to operate in a complex social environment to help work for peace and reconciliation on the island.

Turkish Cypriot Community

Figure 1.2: Turkish Cypriot Civil Society Diamond



Civil society in the TCC scores lowest on Civic Engagement, which indicates low levels of participation by individuals in social and political collective actions and CSOs. The three remaining dimensions that make up the diamond all score around 50. The External Environment scores 70.4 and takes the shape of a relatively wide circle around the diamond, which can be loosely interpreted as suggesting that the context is suitable for further development of civil society in terms of higher participation, organisation, practice of democratic values and impact.

When we analyse the different dimensions in more detail, we see that civil society in the TCC is in a good position with respect to the institutionalisation of CSOs and their prospects for financial sustainability. Although a small group of people is actively involved in civil society, the involvement of this group is deep and extensive. Furthermore, this involvement cuts across different fields, which lends itself to unique opportunities for cooperation and synergy between CSOs working on different issues (e.g. Cyprus NGO Network, Dumansız Ada Platform and EngelSiz İnsiyatifi). This would pave the way for more networking and development of umbrella organisations, albeit unofficially given legal obstacles, which would enhance civil society's capacity for effective advocacy and lobbying. Having made significant progress in recent years in terms of internal governance and financial sustainability, civil society now needs to focus on internalising and then promoting values of tolerance, inclusion and non-violence.

The research highlighted a number of actions which can be addressed to increase the effectiveness of civil society in the TCC. These include:

- Personal development trainings and peace education that focuses on intra-personal peace

- Promotion of more networking and formation of platforms to contribute to a stronger and more effective civil society
- More lobbying for a change in how the state understands civil society
- More emphasis on cooperation and partnership between civil society and public agencies.
- More emphasis on policy-level engagements
- Given the levels of intolerance and discrimination both among the public at large and within civil society, CSOs must be encouraged urgently to adopt a human rights-based approach

Having come a long way in terms of institutionalisation of internal governance structures, securing a diverse base of financial resources and taking steps towards transparency, civil society in the TCC now needs to invest in internalising and spreading values of tolerance, inclusion, participation, democracy and peace. While continuing their involvement in bi-communal activities and promotion of reconciliation at both the grassroots and the elite levels, CSOs need to recognise discrimination and intolerance in all their forms. Civil society's impact seems to be limited particularly on policy-making. Capacity building in advocacy and lobbying, establishing effective communication channels with public officials and decision-makers and cooperation of CSOs as networks and platforms would enhance civil society's political impact. A visible increase in impact might also encourage more people to get engaged in civil society. Despite low levels of both social and political engagement at this point, the fact that CSOs are among social forces most trusted by the public – coming before political parties, the parliament, and the government – suggests that the TCC is open to a more active and vocal civil society.

Bi-communal movements

When looking at the data generated in the CSI report, with particular focus on the population's perception on the value of bi-communal activities related to the reconciliation process, it is evident that both communities are somewhat agreed on the level of impact they exert. The majority of those surveyed, from both the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities, agreed that bi-communal activities contribute positively to the efforts of peace and reconciliation. With this positive perception of the value of bi-communal activities, projects - whether they are locally supported or funded by external international organisations, such as UNDP-ACT, USAID, and more recently the EU and others, continue to have a positive impact within society and play a key role in promoting the importance of peace and reconciliation across the island. However there is still much more work to be done within society, and this is further considered and explained during this report.

The attitudes of civil society and external stakeholders on bi-communal activities and the reconciliation process deviate significantly from that of society at large in both communities. While the public's participation in bi-communal activities has dropped, the depth of involvement of CSOs which undertake such activities increased substantially. It is hoped that Cypriot civil society over the coming years will be able to increase the level of engagement from members of society who have not yet taken part in cross border collaboration and at the same time encourage CSOs to continue to build on their efforts to engage key people in the reconciliation process.

I. THE CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX PROJECT AND APPROACH

The Civil Society Index (CSI), a participatory action-research project assessing the state of civil society in countries around the world, contributes to redressing the limited knowledge about civil society and the lack of opportunities for civil society stakeholders to come together to discuss, reflect and act. It aims at creating a knowledge base and momentum for civil society strengthening. The CSI is initiated and implemented by, and for, CSOs at the country level, in partnership with CIVICUS. The CSI implementation actively involves and disseminates its findings to a broad range of stakeholders including civil society, government, the media, donors, academics, and the public at large.

The following key steps in CSI implementation take place at the country level:

- 1) **Assessment:** CSI uses an innovative mix of participatory research methods, data sources and case studies to assess comprehensively the state of civil society using five dimensions: Civic Engagement, Level of Organisation, Practice of Values, Perception of Impact and the External Environment.
- 2) **Collective reflection:** implementation involves structured dialogue among diverse civil society stakeholders that enables the identification of civil society's specific strengths and weaknesses.
- 3) **Joint action:** the actors involved use a participatory and consultative process to develop and implement a concrete action agenda to strengthen civil society in a country.

The following four sections provide a background of the CSI, its key principles and approaches, and a snapshot of the methodology used in the generation of this report in Cyprus and its limitations.

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The CSI first emerged as a concept over a decade ago as a follow-up to the 1997 *New Civic Atlas* publication by CIVICUS, which contained profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (Heinrich and Naidoo, 2001). The first version of the CSI methodology, developed by CIVICUS with the help of Helmut Anheier, was unveiled in 1999. An initial pilot of the tool was carried out in 2000 in 13 countries.¹ The pilot implementation process and results were evaluated. This evaluation informed a revision of the methodology. Subsequently, CIVICUS successfully implemented the first complete phase of the CSI between 2003 and 2006 in 53 countries worldwide. This implementation directly involved more than 7,000 civil society stakeholders (Heinrich 2008).

Intent on continuing to improve the research-action orientation of the tool, CIVICUS worked with the Centre for Social Investment at the University of Heidelberg, as well as with partners and other stakeholders, to evaluate and revise the CSI methodology for a second time before the start of this current phase of CSI. With this new and streamlined methodology in place, CIVICUS launched the new phase of the CSI in 2008 and selected its country partners, including both previous and new implementers, from all over the globe to participate in the project. Table 1 below includes a list of implementing countries in the current phase of the CSI.

¹ The pilot countries were Belarus, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Romania, South Africa, Ukraine, Uruguay and Wales.

Table 1: List of CSI implementing countries 2008-2011²

1. Albania	15. Italy	29. Niger
2. Argentina	16. Japan	30. Philippines
3. Armenia	17. Jordan	31. Russia
4. Bahrain	18. Kazakhstan	32. Serbia
5. Belarus	19. Kosovo	33. Slovenia
6. Bulgaria	20. Lebanon	34. South Korea
7. Burkina Faso	21. Liberia	35. Sudan
8. Chile	22. Macedonia	36. Togo
9. Croatia	23. Madagascar	37. Turkey
10. Cyprus	24. Mali	38. Uganda
11. Democratic Republic of Congo	25. Malta	39. Ukraine
12. Djibouti	26. Mexico	40. Uruguay
13. Georgia	27. Morocco	41. Venezuela
14. Ghana	28. Nicaragua	42. Zambia

2. PROJECT APPROACH

The current CSI project approach continues to marry assessment and evidence with reflections and action. This approach provides an important reference point for all work carried out within the framework of the CSI. As such, CSI does not produce knowledge for its own sake but instead seeks to apply directly the knowledge generated to stimulate strategies that enhance the effectiveness and role of civil society. With this in mind, the CSI's fundamental methodological bedrocks which have greatly influenced the implementation that this report is based upon include the following:³

Inclusiveness: The CSI framework strives to incorporate a variety of theoretical viewpoints, as well as being inclusive in terms of civil society indicators, actors and processes included in the project.

Universality: Since the CSI is a global project, its methodology seeks to accommodate national variations in context and concepts within its framework.

Comparability: The CSI aims not to rank, but instead to measure comparatively different aspects of civil society worldwide. The possibility for comparisons exists both between different countries or regions within one phase of CSI implementation and between phases.

Versatility: The CSI is specifically designed to achieve an appropriate balance between international comparability and national flexibility in the implementation of the project.

Dialogue: One of the key elements of the CSI is its participatory approach, involving a wide range of stakeholders who collectively own and run the project in their respective countries.

² Note that this list was accurate as of the publication of this Analytical Country Report, but may have changed slightly since the publication, due to countries being added or dropped during the implementation cycle.

³ For in-depth explanations of these principles, see Mati, Silva and Anderson (2010), *Assessing and Strengthening Civil Society Worldwide: An updated programme description of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index Phase 2008-2010*. CIVICUS, Johannesburg.

Capacity development: Country partners are firstly trained on the CSI methodology during a three day regional workshop. After the training, partners are supported through the implementation cycle by the CSI team at CIVICUS. Partners participating in the project also gain substantial skills in research, training and facilitation in implementing the CSI in-country.

Networking: The participatory and inclusive nature of the different CSI tools (e.g. focus groups, the Advisory Committee, the National Workshops) should create new spaces where very diverse actors can discover synergies and forge new alliances, including at a cross-sectoral level. Some countries in the last phase have also participated in regional conferences to discuss the CSI findings as well as cross-national civil society issues.


Change: The principal aim of the CSI is to generate information that is of practical use to civil society practitioners and other primary stakeholders. Therefore, the CSI framework seeks to identify aspects of civil society that can be changed and to generate information and knowledge relevant to action-oriented goals.

With the above mentioned foundations, the CSI methodology uses a combination of participatory and scientific research methods to generate an assessment of the state of civil society at the national level. The CSI measures the following core dimensions:

- (1) Civic Engagement
- (2) Level of Organisation
- (3) Practice of Values
- (4) Perceived Impact
- (5) External Environment

These dimensions are illustrated visually through the Civil Society Diamond (see Figure 1.3 below), which is one of the most essential and well-known components of the CSI project. To form the Civil Society Diamond, 67 quantitative indicators are aggregated into 28 sub-dimensions which are then assembled into the five final dimensions along a 0-100 percentage scale. The diamond's size seeks to portray an empirical picture of the state of civil society, the conditions that support or inhibit civil society's development, and the consequences of civil society's activities for society at large. The context or environment is represented visually by a circle around the axes of the Civil Society Diamond, and is not regarded as part of the state of civil society but rather as something external that still remains a crucial element for its wellbeing.


Figure 1.3: The Civil Society Index Diamond



3. CSI IMPLEMENTATION

There are several key CSI programme implementation activities as well as several structures involved, as summarised by the figure below:⁴

Figure 1.4: CSI implementation process



⁴ For a detailed discussion on each of these steps in the process, please see Mati et al (cited in footnote 3).

The major tools and elements of the CSI implementation at the national level include:

- Multiple surveys, including: (i) a **Population Survey**, gathering the views of citizens on civil society and gauging their involvement in groups and associations; (ii) an **Organisational Survey** measuring the meso-level of civil society and defining characteristics of CSOs; (iii) an **External Perceptions Survey** aiming at measuring the perception that stakeholders, experts and policy makers in key sectors have of civil society's impact.
- Tailored **case studies** which focus on issues of importance to the specific civil society country context.
- **Advisory Committee (AC)** meetings made up of civil society experts to advise on the project and its implementation.
- Regional and thematic **focus groups** where civil society stakeholders reflect and share views on civil society's role in society.

Following this in-depth research and the extensive collection of information, the findings are presented and debated at **workshops**, which brings together a large group of civil society and non-civil society stakeholders and allows interested parties to discuss and develop strategies for addressing identified priority issues.

This Analytical Country Report is one of the major outputs of the CSI implementation process in Cyprus, and presents highlights from the research conducted, including summaries of civil society's strengths and weaknesses as well as recommendations for strengthening civil society in Cyprus.

4. LIMITATIONS OF CSI STUDY

Civil society is a complex concept that is difficult to understand in a globally-relevant and applicable manner. The CSI study aims to assess the state of civil society in different countries in a way that allows for context specificity, without reneging on cross-country comparability. In order to do this most effectively, a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods are utilised.

According to the CIVICUS 2005 study, civil society is an arena where different groups of people interact with different scopes and objectives, and therefore civil society is not a homogeneous group but rather heterogeneous and dynamic. The methodology used during the previous CSI study underestimates the significance of the diversity of civil society. The methodology for the current study is simpler and involves less data than that employed for the 2005 study (CIVICUS, 2005).

A particular focus of the recent CSI study in Cyprus was to incorporate context-specific ideas into the survey questionnaires, with questions that specifically captured the role of civil society in reconciliation and the ongoing peace process. The CSI study was implemented simultaneously on both sides of the island in a coordinated way with periodic joint meetings and consultations to ensure utmost comparability of results. The two research teams, however, believe that the results may not be truly comparable, since each community has significant differences between each other and from the other participating countries.

Other limitations of the study relate to the availability and the quality of quantitative data used. Due to financial limitations, the three surveys which provided the bulk of data used in measuring the four dimensions that characterise civil society had to be conducted mainly via phone interviews. Although neither the AC nor the people contacted in our structured interviews or the focus groups raised doubts on whether the results we found were

representative of the current population in Cyprus, being able to conduct the surveys face-to-face would have ensured better quality data. Large numbers of 'don't know' responses or the missing responses we see in the Population Survey, for instance, could be due to ineffective communication over the phone.

Some specific considerations and limitations of the research methodology include the following, in the Greek Cypriot Community:

1. Some of the questions in the survey questionnaires were not applicable in Greek Cypriot society or were not easily understood by the participants in the surveys. A limited number of adjustments to questions were made to ensure the most successful outcome.
2. The research tools used were limited and as a result additional data was needed in order to accurately analyse some of the dimensions and sub-dimensions. Regional stakeholder consultations, media reviews and focus groups were some additional research tools deemed necessary for the success of the project.
3. The Greek Cypriot Community is not as homogeneous as it was a few years ago as there are significant minority and ethnic groups temporarily working or permanently residing in Cyprus. These groups are not proportionally represented in the population survey because their addresses and phone numbers are often not listed.

A particular challenge for the study in the Turkish Cypriot Community was the lack of data on macro socio-economic indicators used in measuring the External Environment dimension. Because most international databases, such as the Basic Capabilities Index and the World Bank Development Indicators, do not provide separate data for the Turkish Cypriot Community, values representing the Greek Cypriot Community were used for the TCC as well. Given the obvious difference between levels of social and economic development between the two communities, the data used in this study suggests that the socio-economic context for the TCC is more developed than it actually is. Hence, the suitability of the External Environment for a more vibrant and effective civil society in the TCC is over-estimated.

II. CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

1. CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The definition of civil society, used in the CSI study phase 2003-2005, which defined civil society as: *“the space between families, government and the market, where people associate in order to promote common interests”* is commonly accepted. The CSI phase 2008-2011 introduced a new definition, which differed slightly from the previous one. This definition describes civil society as: *“the arena – outside of the family, the state, and the market – which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests.”* These changes were discussed by the AC and at the regional consultations, and the final definition was agreed upon through regional consultations in the 2010 study.

What is important to understand about the ‘arena’, as used in the description of civil society, is that its shape and character are fundamentally determined by its relationship to the state. Although civil society lies ‘outside’ the state, it is largely defined by it. The kind of arena that civil society depends upon includes, among other things, the legal provisions in place and the way they are enforced by state agencies; the way citizens understand their role vis-à-vis the state; and the extent to which citizens are aware of the existence and the potential of that arena. It is no accident, therefore, that civil society is thought to function at its best in more established democracies where civil rights and civil liberties are safeguarded and notions of citizenship are more entrenched. The direct opposite is evident as it is seen as less vibrant in societies with authoritarian, clientelistic political institutions of the sort found in many post-colonial societies.

The way political institutions function in such societies is regarded as fundamentally different from the way they do in more established democratic systems, generally referred to as the West (Potter, 1997). In post-colonial societies, the state often takes on more authoritarian and ‘interventionist’ forms, political institutions take time to develop, particularly since many such countries must address formidable structural problems pertaining to economic development, of dependence on more other more powerful countries and, often their own political survival as they cope with internal strife and tension (Clapham, 1985).

2. HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE GCC

The above provides a background to understanding Cyprus’ context, as in order to come to grips with insights into a civil society on an island granted its formal independence in 1960, it is essential to understand the specificity of the country’s polity, society and economy. Cyprus is a unique post-colonial society in at least two important respects.

First, although in 1960 Cyprus’ structural characteristics could be compared to those of an underdeveloped economy, it managed to develop its economy and raise its standard of living to levels comparable to those of more ‘developed’ economies. Compared to other post-colonial societies, Cyprus does not have high unemployment rates, shanty towns and widespread poverty or other indicators showing lack of development of the sort found in many Asian and African countries. This by no means implies that some major structural problems such as an overdependence on services (particularly tourism), foreign sources of raw materials, low levels of productive investment, regional disparities and a weak agricultural sector have been resolved (see Mavros, 1989, 1993; Christodoulou, 1992, 1995).

One of the factors that led to the rapid growth of the economy was the role of trade unions that managed to become respected partners in the developmental efforts of the government.

A second feature was the unwillingness of its inhabitants to accept the state that was established in 1960 as 'their' state.

The Greek Cypriot-led 1955 to 1959 anti-colonial struggle in Cyprus did not aim to create an independent Cypriot state, but rather to unite the island with Greece; this is known as *enosis*. But *enosis* was clearly not acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot Community, members of which did not want to become citizens of a Greek state that they considered hostile to their culture. Within the Turkish Cypriot Community, there were groups advocating for *taksim*, the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey. Greece and Turkey have been important factors in the formation of socio-political processes in Cyprus. They were considered 'the mother countries': culturally, the source of inspiration and important identity reference points for many Cypriots, and materially as a source of support but also to many, especially to Turkish Cypriots, a 'lifejacket' to help the two communities progress through the turbulent waves of international politics. No understanding of the formation and structure of Cypriot public space and the civil society arena can afford to ignore the significance attached by many of the inhabitants of the island on their respective 'mother' countries. By the same token, one cannot ignore how the position of the two countries in the international division of labour and international politics, in conjunction with the specificity of their internal socio-economic and political problems, affected polity and society in the island of Cyprus.

Therefore, for reasons that cannot be discussed within the limited context of this introduction, the fight against British rule failed to unite the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots into an all-encompassing anti-colonial movement (Attalides, 1979; Pollis, 1979; Kitromilides, 1979).

There were however, instances of bi-communal cooperation, primarily among politically leftist groups, especially trade unions, as well as cooperation between ordinary people as they were going about their everyday lives in the villages. But members of the 'other' community were certainly not included in preoccupations of the leaders and their followers of both communities.

The state that emerged from anti-colonial struggle was a state that few actually wanted (Persianis, 2004). To many Greek Cypriots, the government established in 1960 was a compromise, as aims to unite with Greece did not materialise. During the 1960s and early 1970s, few social forces advocated notions of Cypriot citizenship. Meanwhile, from 1963 until 1974, there was political unrest and armed conflict, both within the Greek Cypriot community itself, as well as between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, culminating in the de facto division of the island in 1974. A coup was staged by the Greek junta, with the help of local extreme nationalist groups, which led to a military intervention by Turkey. During the 1960s and early 1970s within the Greek Cypriot community, division emerged between a minority that advocated *enosis* at all costs and challenged the legitimacy of the Cypriot state and those who argued that international circumstances were not ripe to pursue the cause of *enosis*. In the ideological sphere, however, no side really disputed that union with Greece was a worthwhile goal to be pursued (Mavratsas, 2001a). The critical issue, at least at the level of rhetoric, was on the timing and, for those who opposed the government, on whether those who advocated a slower progression towards this goal were sincere.

The impact of this peculiar political situation upon civil society was enormous. Not only did the new state have to overcome the usual obstacles that newly established post-colonial states face, but it also had to address major suspicions of many of its citizens.

One other relevant factor was that a military coup in Greece had enforced change. The Greek military junta supported the militant anti-government groups in Cyprus. Therefore, the state was challenged by armed conflict. Instances of bi-communal cooperation were few and were mainly found to the left of the political spectrum. Political parties did not really acquire the complexion of parties, as known in modern democracies, until after 1974 (Papaioannou, 1981; Zavou, 2002).

The Cypriot public sphere, including civil society, could be described as a place in a constant state of mobilisation, where slogans and fanaticism prevailed. Social criticism was absent (Attalides, 1993). Although the situation has changed over the years, until fairly recently there have been few attempts by citizens to hold the state and private corporations accountable for their actions.

For many years, the prevailing argument was that, with the inter-communal conflict still unresolved and the very survival of Greek Cypriots at stake, the Republic of Cyprus was going through difficult times, forcing citizens to be careful with demands. The state had other preoccupations, and citizens were not to raise issues that were not priorities. This issue of the unresolved political problem is still considered as a main reason for the embryonic state of civil society in Cyprus.

Within civil society at that time, professional associations, welfare organisations and cultural and athletic groups were emerging. Another prominent presence has been the Church and faith-based organisations. This is as a result of the Orthodox Church's powerful role as the main articulating force of the interests of Greek Cypriots during colonial times, and the influence of the first President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, who was also the head of the Church.

After 1974, the polity gradually began to acquire the complexion of a modern democracy with political parties, regular elections and institutions and procedures in place that allowed for greater state transparency and accountability. Notions of citizenship however remained feeble and civil society was still very much seen as a peculiar arena (Mavratsas, 2001, Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2005). It had, with a fairly strong trade union movement, many voluntary, welfare organisations and sports and recreational associations, but few human rights and advocacy groups. The omnipresence of the political in all spheres of social life was clearly the most telling characteristic of the public sphere in the Greek Cypriot Community of the island.

The sociologist Mavratsas (2001b, pp.48) writes:

“Cypriot society is characterised by a relatively underdeveloped civil society that prevents the creation of a liberal public ethic. As a result, the political sphere is dominated by corporatist orientations that create a clientelistic hyperpoliticisation and an excessive statism which essentially crash the concept of the citizen. State authority together with the party mechanisms that support it constitutes the dominant sphere of social life. To a great extent, politics control both the economy and, in a wider sense, the society. A proof of this situation is the fact that the political parties have established bodies, such as student unions, youth associations and women's organisations, all of whom have members of the political party. These bodies act as NGOs but as they have the support and financial contributions of the party they therefore act on the policies of that political party.”

Similar comments can be found in a more recent report (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2005, pp.46-47): ‘Public sphere’ here refers to the areas outside the family and the market. It includes the sphere of politics and civil society. It is no accident, for example, that the

overwhelming majority of CSOs are social and recreational associations and sports clubs, amounting to 30% of all registered and unregistered CSOs.

Civic participation of the majority of the Greek Cypriot population is marked by the dominance of the 'national question' in the public sphere and by the role played by political parties. The turbulent history of the island, culminating with the events of 1974, affects Cypriots today. Greek Cypriots tend to think that everything has a political cause and that is the role of politicians to deal with almost all issues facing society. Political power, as exercised by the state and political parties, assumes a hegemonic role, controlling not only the economy but also society at large, as is evident in education, the media, cultural production and volunteer organisations (mainly charities), and resulting in the underdevelopment of civil society.

The 2004 referendum on the unification of the island stimulated discussions in the Greek Cypriot Community regarding the influence of international donors in relation to the work of CSOs. The authorities were considered by civil society to be attempting to put forward a particular political view relating the reconciliation efforts on the island, and during this debate many statements were made regarding the role and independence of CSOs. This created a negative feeling in Cypriot society about CSOs which receive funding from international donors, which continues to have an effect on the way in which CSOs are perceived to the present day.

The accession of Cyprus into the European Union (EU) in 2004 was an important milestone for the development of civil society in the Greek Cypriot Community. It helped CSOs participate in a number of EU projects and in European networks. Most importantly, advocacy and human rights emerged as areas of concern and a number of advocacy organisations were established. During the same period, peace building and bi-communal organisations were mobilised for a solution in Cyprus. This resulted in open discussions on the structure and role of civil society, particularly for peace and reconciliation in Cyprus. Two different trends have become established in civil society: the development of 'traditional' social welfare organisations and the relatively 'new' trend for lobbying and advocacy.

UNDP-ACT has had a significant role in the development of CSOs, by providing a number of programmes aimed at building the capacity of organisations working towards peace and reconciliation in Cyprus, which continues to impact positively on the level of inter-communal engagement.

In 2007, a number of CSOs, in cooperation with CyprusAid and the United Nations Development Programme – Action for Cooperation and Trust (UNDP-ACT), initiated an assessment of the legal and regulatory framework affecting CSOs in the Greek Cypriot Community, for the purpose of building a legal framework which is comparable to other member states of the EU, and also with the added benefit of strengthening the opportunities for increased bi-communal relationships.

3. MAPPING CIVIL SOCIETY

In order to identify important social actors and their various relations, the NIT carried out a Social Forces Analysis exercise. This maps and analyses social forces in society as a whole, and focuses on civil society in particular. The size of each circle reflects its relative level of influence and as the location of each circle in relation to the centre of the graphic represents its level of influence, with the circles on the periphery having least influence and those in the centre exerting most influence.

CSOs function within a complex socio-political context in Cyprus, where unsupportive legislative, institutional and conceptual frameworks, as well as limited funding sources, inhibit the growth and development of civil society, which, as a result, exists as an emerging industry. Organisations which make up the sector have a number of strengths to build upon, however, including: strong dynamic leaders, sound organisational values and beliefs, ongoing support from local communities, and high-level expertise upon which to draw.

However, the Advisory Committee stated that CSOs also identify a range of weaknesses in their internal, programming and relational spheres of work, particularly as CSOs have not yet fully recognised the need or developed the capacity to participate in policy decisions affecting the island's development. Through a recent programme on civil society capacity building, CSOs expressed the need for improved leadership skills, strategic organisational development, project planning and improved networking skills. They also specified a need to increase the visibility and profile of the sector as a whole, with increased discussion, knowledge and understanding of key issues facing civil society.

In Cyprus, it is evident that the political agenda plays a consistent and forceful role in any discussions about society; this has been prevalent for at least the past 60 years. The political agenda permeates all aspects of society, from influencing the education system, media reporting, and development of both the private sector and civil society.

Civil society has been active in peace building efforts in Cyprus since the 1980s, with CSOs having a limited but important role campaigning for the peace process leading to the UN supported Annan Plan in 2004. The plan was placed before the two communities in a parallel and simultaneous vote in the Cyprus reunification referendum of 24 April 2004. The Annan Plan was dependent upon approval by both communities with the vote in the Turkish Cypriot community largely supportive, and the Greek Cypriot community broadly rejecting the proposals, and therefore reunification did not take place. The main concerns of people in the Greek Cypriot Community were the long period for the implementation of certain provisions and the absence of any guarantees that the plan would be finally implemented.

Activities of CSOs in Cyprus to promote peace and reconciliation remained relatively weak compared to the opposition civil society that rallied against it with the previous Cypriot Government, which held a more conservative agenda. Despite the abundance of bi-communal social activities and problem-solving workshops, civil society has not been very effective in achieving long term peace building in Cyprus.

Participants also noted that most actors identified as part of the exercise had both a positive and negative effect on society, but that overall, the political agenda has had a negative effect as it has encouraged society to retain a conservative agenda.

The education system in particular was singled out as having negative impacts on society; teaching and learning had become influenced by the ruling political party and the Church. The education authority, under the recently elected Communist Party, had tried to integrate a multicultural and bi-communal agenda into schools, which was rejected by teachers' trade unions.

The admittance of Cyprus into the EU has increasingly had a positive effect on society, as it encourages citizens to be less internally focused. Recently, a number of para-statal institutions, such as the police, have begun to inform citizens about their legal rights in terms of the services they offer. Cypriot laws, policies and procedures will need to increasingly be

altered to conform to EU standards as it draws closer to the completion of all chapters of the Acquis Communautaire.⁵

Trade unions and other movements also have a large role in affecting change in society. The banking sector and labour trade unions hold the strongest positions of power within this group.

During the mapping exercise, a consideration was made as to how much leverage civil society possesses and what degree of change it can influence in society as a whole. Participants noted that historically, CSOs have held little influence, unless populated by members of the ruling political parties. Political parties have established bodies, such as student unions and others, all of whom are members of the party. These bodies act as NGOs, but have the support and finances of a party and can influence and act on a party's policies. Political parties created these organisations as a way to boost a limited civil society, but have consequently blurred the lines between state and civil society.

An example of a CSO being populated by members of the ruling political party is the Red Cross. The Board of Directors at the Red Cross is headed by a 'President' – a position that is always reserved for the spouse of the incumbent Leader of the Greek Cypriot Community. They are one of a minority of organisations that have guaranteed access to institutions such as schools, whereas other CSOs must apply to the education authority to receive permission to visit. Almost all citizens of Cyprus who undertake voluntary work have at some point volunteered for the Red Cross.

Finally, it was noted that there is increasing realisation of the importance of strengthening civil society. The influence of multi-national bodies, such as the EU and UNDP-ACT, is generally welcomed by civil society stakeholders on this matter.

⁵ The Acquis Communautaire refers to the body of EU legislation which new EU members must adopt.

Figure 2.1: Mapping of social forces in society





Figure 2.2: Mapping of civil society




III. ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CYPRUS FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses the five dimensions of civil society, as set out in the CSI methodology. Each dimension consists of multiple sub-dimensions, helping to provide more detailed information. As described previously, indicator scoring was based on data collected in the three CSI surveys conducted in the Greek Cypriot Community, as well as additional secondary databases. In order to take into consideration the existence of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus, additional questions were included, along with the standardised CSI enquiries. Results of these questions are highlighted in a comparative section.

Interviews were also conducted with members of the previous implementing CSI team. This was to help identify any changes evident in Greek Cypriot civil society between 2005 and 2010, and to discuss the impact of the 2005 CSI report.

Figure 2.3: Greek Cypriot Civil Society Diamond



1. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

The Civic Engagement dimension is one of the core components of CSI's definition of civil society, as it explores the extent, depth and diversity of socially-based and political engagement. It describes both formal and informal activities undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests.

Socially-based engagement refers to exchanges within the public sphere that advance shared interests of a social or recreational nature. Examples include working in food kitchens, or running a sport club. These activities are extremely important not only because

they promote mutual care and offer ways of spending one's spare time, but also because they build social capital.

Political engagement refers to activities that advance shared interests of a political nature. Activities might include participation in a demonstration, or signing petitions. These activities aim at impacting on policies and/or bringing about social change at the macro-level.

Civic engagement is made up of the six sub-dimensions set out in Table 2. These aim to show how active civil society is in the GCC, its strength, diversity and overall size, both for political and social organisations. The score of Civic Engagement is 43.6%, and it is the lowest score of all five dimensions.

Table 2: Civic Engagement sub-dimension scores

		Score (%)
1	Civic Engagement	43.6
1.1	Extent of socially-based engagement	24.1
1.2	Depth of socially-based engagement	30.4
1.3	Diversity of socially-based engagement	77.2
1.4	Extent of political engagement	23.5
1.5	Depth of political engagement	23.8
1.6	Diversity of political engagement	82.5

1.1 Extent of social engagement

This sub-dimension analyses the extent to which the GCC public is engaged in social organisations or in certain social activities with other people, such as sports clubs. It also studies how extended volunteering is through unpaid volunteering work for certain social organisations.


1.1.1 Social membership

A disappointing 80.4% of the population does not belong to any social organisation. 14.0% are active members of at least one such organisation, whilst 5.6% are inactive members. When compared to CSI 2005, during which 43% were reported to be members of at least one CSO, then membership would seem to be reducing fast. On the other hand, during interviews and consultations, civil society experts felt that there was not a significant reduction in membership, although they agree that in the last few years, it had become more difficult for CSOs to attract active members.


The CSI Population Survey showed that the membership to the five most popular types of social organisations was 11.9 to 9.3%. Professional associations were the most popular (11.9% of respondents were members), followed by trade or labour unions, sports associations, political parties and co-operative/credit associations or savings groups. In the 2005 CSI study sports associations and trade unions were in the largest CSO categories.

The level of membership in trade unions and professional associations is high among Greek Cypriots because many professions have traditionally strong unions and almost all employees are members, examples including the construction industry, civil servants, teachers and bank employees, while many professions require membership of a professional association (such as engineers, mechanics, lawyers, accountants, doctors and hairdressers). Sports associations and clubs play a significant role in the sports, social and even political life of Cyprus and therefore have a strong support among the people. Cooperative unions can be found in every community, and are well respected by the Greek Cypriots because they assisted in the economic development of the island and support almost every family.


Figure 2.4: Percentage of the population that are active members of social organisations



The CSI Population Survey showed that professional associations were the most popular, followed by trade or labour unions, sports associations, political parties and co-operative/credit or savings groups.

Figure 2.5: Five most popular types of organisations

1.1.2 Social volunteering

Figure 2.6: Percentage of population volunteering for at least one social organisation

When asked whether people volunteer for at least one social organisation, 87.5% answered negatively; only 12.5% stated they were active. In 2005, 51% of respondents reported that they assisted an organisation or provided community support, while only 7% assisted voluntarily. Despite the apparent positive increase, voluntary assistance to social organisations remains low and creates serious problems to the efficient operation of many organisations.

5.3% of volunteers assist education groups, followed by sports associations (5.0%) and political parties (5.0%). Less favoured are religious or spiritual groups (4.6%), cultural groups or associations (4.4%) and health groups and social service associations (4.4%).

The average time spent on volunteer work per month is 3.3 hours; down from 5 hours in 2005 (CIVICUS CSI, 2005).

The global economic crisis, with its negative impact on the Cypriot economy, has ended 30 years of economic growth and created uncertainty and anxiety among the Greek Cypriot society. In 2009 and 2010, most economic sectors were adversely affected, especially tourism, construction and trade. This is reflected in the 1.7% contraction of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009, compared to the 3.6% increase in 2008 (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2010). Certain economic indicators, such as consumption and unemployment, have worsened, with confidence indicators in the red, indicating further contraction for months to come (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2010). While on average, 37% of Europeans believe the impact of the crisis on jobs has reached its peak, only 22% of Cypriot citizens felt the same, with many more believing the “worst is still to come” (European Commission, 2010).


The impact of the economic crisis on everyday life of Cypriots, the lack of free time, and changing priorities may explain why active membership and voluntarism are decreasing.

1.1.3 Community engagement

Community engagement was evaluated as a social activity related to family, relatives and friends and as a social activity related to civil society groups. A large number of the Greek Cypriot community engage in social activities related to family, relatives and friends, as 84.7% spend time with relatives. 76.5% spend time with friends weekly or nearly every week, while only 18.8% spend time with other people from sports clubs or voluntary organisations.

More than half of the sample population (53.0%) said that they do not engage in social activities with other people at sports clubs or voluntary / service organisations at all; 18.8% engages weekly or nearly every week, 12.8% once or twice a month and 14.1% only a few times a year.

Figure 2.7: Percentage of the population that engage several times a year in social activities with other people at sports clubs or voluntary/service organisations




1.2 Depth of social engagement

This sub-dimension allows for a deeper analysis of the data covered in the section above. In particular, it measures the percentage of the population that is an active member of or is offering unpaid volunteering work for more than one social organisation. Furthermore, it shows the percentage of people who engage more actively than others in social activities.

1.2.1 Social membership


Figure 2.8: Percentage of the population active in more than one social organisation



The CSI Population Survey revealed that 9.8% of respondents who are active members of a social CSO are active in more than one organisation. This is significantly lower than 2005, when 36% answered for the same question (CSI, 2005). CSO experts do not believe that there was a significant reduction in membership, but again they agree that in the last few years it has become more difficult to attract active members.

1.2.2 Social volunteering

Figure 2.9: Percentage of the population that does voluntary work for more than one social organisation



Only 12.2% of the respondents who do voluntary work are doing it for more than one social organisation. From the available data and the opinion of CSO leaders, it seems that a small number of the total population is actually active and volunteering in social organisations. Furthermore, the same individuals organise or participate in many civil society activities or hold leadership positions in multiple organisations. This phenomenon is stronger in small and medium size communities, where a small number of people lead local organisations and the core participants in activities are same every time.

1.2.3 Community engagement

From the sample group that engage in social activities with other people at sports clubs or voluntary/service organisations, 69.1% are very active, meaning they engage at least once a month and 30.9% are less active, participating only a few times a year.

1.3 Diversity of social engagement

The CSI regards civil society as an arena where conflicting interests and power relations are played out. In this context, the presence of different social groups (especially traditionally marginalised groups) should not be taken for granted, but rather seen as an important empirical element to assess. This sub-dimension examines distributions of gender, age, socio-economic background, ethnicity and geographical region of those participating in civil society by comparing the levels within civil society.

The CSI Population Survey data was analysed to identify the level of representation among CSOs for various categories. It was then compared to the general population to draw the following observations.

Women provide 43.5% of active membership in social organisations, and 55.6% of these reported being active members in more than one social organisation. In 2008, women comprised 51% of the population, which can be interpreted as meaning they are somewhat under-represented (Republic of Cyprus Statistical Department, 2009). In general, women in Cyprus are not equally represented in political life.

The age group 18 to 24, which comprises 19.3% of the GCC population, represents 28.3% of active members of social organisations. The group of 25 to 64 year olds comprises 64.0% of the population and 60.9% of the active members, while the age group over 64 years old contributes 16.7% of the population and 10.9% of the active members. An interesting observation is that no person over 64 years old is active in more than one group. The results reveal that young people are sufficiently represented and older people are somewhat under-represented.

Active membership according to social classes of participants showed that 4.5% belong to the upper class, 14.8% to the upper middle class, 71.6% to the lower middle class and 9.1% to the lower class.

During consultation with civil society experts, it was expressed that ethnic and linguistic minorities are severely unrepresented. This was also a conclusion from the CSI 2005 (CIVICUS, 2005). From the CSI Population Survey, 4.5% stated that they belong to an ethnic minority, and they represented only 2.2% of the active membership in social organisations.

Communities with under 2,000 people make up 15.2% of the GCC population according to the 2001 census (Republic of Cyprus Statistics Department, 2009) and 14.1% of active members of social organisations based on CSI analysis. Their participation in social organisations is therefore almost equally represented.

In the 2005 CSI study, a survey among civil society stakeholders concluded that significant groups within society were not equitably represented in the membership of CSOs. Poor people, residents of rural areas, foreign workers and members of ethnic and linguistic minorities were perceived to be the least represented. The majority of the stakeholders believed that only members of the upper class and the elite were equitably represented in membership of CSOs. Women and young people were considered to be equitably represented or somewhat unrepresented by 78% and 74% of respectively.

Even though the data gathering methodology of the current study is very different from the 2005 study, the trends here remain the same:

- Ethnic or linguistic minorities and foreign workers are severely unrepresented
- Lower class or poor people are under-represented
- Women and young people are somewhat under-represented

A difference is in the representation of rural area residents, which was assessed as severely under-represented in 2005 study but as almost equally represented in the current study.

1.4 Extent of political engagement


The sub-dimension exploring the extent of political engagement describes the percentage of people who are active members of political organisations such as labour unions, or environmental and professional organisations. It reveals the extent of volunteering in these

types of organisations and also the population that have undertaken some kind of political activism in the past five years such as signing a petition or joining a boycott.

1.4.1 Political membership

According to the CSI Population Survey, 14.0% of people are active members of political organisations and 17.5% are inactive members.

Figure 2.10: Percentage of population that are members of a political organisation




1.4.2 Political volunteering

More than 88% of the GCC population do not perform any unpaid voluntary work for a political organisation, with only 11.9% offering some type of volunteering.

1.4.3 Individual activism

Participation of the GCC in various forms of individual activism such as signing a petition, attending a peaceful demonstration or joining a boycott during the last five years was surveyed. The most popular act of political activism was signing a petition (33.8%), followed by attendance at a peaceful demonstration (20.6%) and joining boycotts (6.0%). In the 2005 CSI study, when asked if people have ever participated in non-partisan political action, 59% reported that they had taken part in a demonstration, 46% had signed a petition, 35% had taken part in a strike and 16% had written a letter to a newspaper. Comparing data with everyday experiences, it is obvious there is a continuous decline in individual activism, with the exception of internet polling or petitioning, which became very fashionable in the last few years.

Figure 2.11: Percentage of population who have participated in political activism in the past five years



1.5 Depth of political engagement

This sub-dimension analyses the percentage of the population that are active members of or who do voluntary work for more than one organisation of a political nature. This helps to provide more insight into the depth of political engagement occurring within civil society. Also, it shows how many people are considered to be very active regarding actions of a political orientation. Political engagement scored 23.8%, which is lower than socially-based engagement by 6.6%.

1.5.1 Political membership

This indicator measures the depth of political membership by calculating the percentage of political organisations' members active in more than one organisation. 16.3% are active in more than one political organisation while 83.7% are active in just one political organisation.

1.5.2 Political volunteering

The depth of political volunteering is measured by the percentage of people doing unpaid work for more than one political organisation. From active members of political organisations that perform unpaid voluntary work, 20.5% volunteer for more than one political organisation and 79.5% for only one.

1.5.3 Individual activism

The depth of individual activism measures the percentage of respondents who have been very active in a political orientation, such as signing more than one petition or taking part in more than one peaceful demonstration. A low 34.7% of the population are very active, showing limited activism rates in the community.

1.6 Diversity of political engagement

Both socially-based and politically-based engagement score very low in extent and depth and cannot be judged as satisfactory for a modern and progressive European society. Diversity scored surprisingly high, at 82.5%, and gave an overall increase to the Civic

Engagement score. Political diversity is higher by 5.3% compared to socially-based diversity. In both types of organisations, the representation and inclusion of ethnic minority groups, older people and people from small communities need to be strengthened.

Participants at consultation meetings stressed that the inclusion and representation of ethnic groups, and other social groups such as the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual community (LGBT) is very difficult and will take time to occur, as the GCC society is not mature and progressive enough to accept this. As a result, no significant change since 2005 was made on the representation of ethnic or linguistic minority groups or foreign workers. Some progress was reported in the representation of women, however, both in membership and leadership. In addition, CSOs promoting progressive and controversial issues have a greater impact and receive more press coverage currently than in 2005. Some examples include KISA – Action for Equality Support, Antiracism, Cyprus Women’s Lobby and Accept - Cyprus, an LGBT rights movement. UNDP-ACT funding has assisted some CSOs of this nature to develop and thus has helped to provide a voice to unrepresented social groups.

In addition, GCC civil society remains very centralised in Nicosia, the capital city, where policies are decided, progressive CSOs are formed, infrastructure is developed and most activities are organised. Civil society is therefore more influential in Nicosia than in the rest of the island. The 2005 CSI study also found that CSOs are not equally distributed, because Nicosia, the capital, concentrates 60% of registered organisations and Limasol, the second largest city, 20%. It is very important for authorities, funders and stronger CSOs to reach out and assist CSOs in other areas of Cyprus to give them the opportunity to participate in policy and decision-making processes.

2. LEVEL OF ORGANISATION

The dimension of the Level of Organisation scored 59.8%. This dimension looks at the organisational development of civil society as a whole. In order to do so, it assesses the level of complexity and sophistication in a carefully selected sample of CSOs.

In this section, a number of indicators are examined: internal governance, infrastructure, communication, human resources, financial and technological resources, and international linkages.


Table 3: Level of organisation sub-dimension scores

		Score (%)
2	Level of Organisation	59.8
2.1	Internal governance	98.9
2.2	Support infrastructure	80.7
2.3	Sectoral communication	77.4
2.4	Human resources	16.5
2.5	Financial and technological resources	74.8
2.6	International linkages	10.6

2.1 Internal governance

This sub-dimension measures organisations with a board of directors or a formal steering committee. 98.9% of organisations have such formalised systems in place, while just 1.1% of the sample stated that they do not. This is the highest score for this dimension.


Figure 2.12: Percentage of organisations with a board of directors or a formal steering committee



2.2 Support infrastructure

This sub-section looked at membership of organisations in any federation, umbrella group or support network. 80.7% of organisations surveyed stated that they were formal members of either a federation, umbrella group or support network, whilst 19.3% said that they are not.

Figure 2.13: Percentage of organisations that are formal members of any federation, umbrella group or support network



In the 2005 CSI, many stakeholders believed that umbrella organisations could not be effective due to reasons beyond their control, such as government's economic policies influencing the environment. Five years later, even though most CSOs are members of


federations or umbrella groups, they prefer to act independently. Cooperation and networks are limited due to culture, lack of experience and the fear of losing control, identity and autonomy.

CSOs from both Cypriot communities wanting to cooperate tend to do so by forming an unofficial network and signing a Memorandum of Understanding. A best practice example is the foundation of the Home of Cooperation (see below).

2.3 Sectoral communication

Sectoral communication measures the extent to which organisations with similar interests communicate and cooperate in order to form networks, alliances and productive relations. It is evaluated through two indicators which show the percentage of organisations that held meetings and the percentage that exchanged information with other organisations within the past three months. According to the CSI Organisational Survey, 72.4% of CSOs held recent meetings with other organisations working on similar issues and 82.4% exchanged information with another organisation.

Figure 2.14: Percentage of organisations that have recently (within the past three months) held meetings with other organisations working on similar issues




The 2005 CSI study revealed that CSO stakeholders believed that CSOs occasionally cooperate with each other on issues of common concern, with 41% stating that there were very few examples of cooperations between organisations of different sectors. The best known examples were in the areas of culture, environment, health and social support. In the years since new forms of cooperation were formed, including:

- Home for Cooperation (H4C) – Association for Historic Dialogue and Research: The H4C houses a multi-functional research and educational centre aimed at young people, educators, historians and researchers, which includes a centre for exhibitions and archives, a library and a work space for CSOs. The ‘Home’ is considered to be the first inter-communal building that promotes research and dialogue and issues regarding history education, providing a common meeting place to bridge the island's two communities, where teachers, academics, researchers and CSO activists can come together to discuss history and learn from each other.
- The Cyprus Community Media Centre: The Centre opened its doors in late 2009, aiming to establish community media in Cyprus and support local organisations and

community groups in communicating their message to a wider audience. It has over 25 members, which are non-governmental organisations and civil society associations working on issues such as women, youth, education, human rights, reconciliation, gender and health. It is supported by UNDP – Action for Cooperation and Trust.

- **Cyprus Island-Wide NGO Development Platform (CYINDEP):** CYINDEP was created by two member platforms, the Cyprus NGO Platform ‘The Development’ in the Greek Cypriot Community and the Cyprus NGO Network in the Turkish Cypriot Community. Together they represent 25 CSOs and aim to build the capacities of Cypriot CSOs engaged in international development issues through international platforms such as CONCORD, the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development.

Figure 2.15: Percentage of organisations that have exchanged information with another organisation within the past three months



During the specified three months, most organisations had meetings or exchanged information with up to five organisations (64.9% and 76.9% respectively), 12.3% communicated with six to ten organisations and approximately 11% with more than 10 organisations.

2.4 Human resources

Sustainability of human resources in CSOs is assessed by this sub-dimension, which measures the percentage of organisations the paid staff of which amount to at least 75% of the total work force (comprising paid staff and volunteers). The score for this indicator for sustainability of human resources is 16.5%, which mean that GCC CSOs do not in the main depend on paid staff but on volunteers. The small size of most organisations and the available funds do not allow them to employ professionals.

Table 4: Staff base of organisations by category of staff

Staff base	Number of staff						
	0	1 - 5	6 – 10	11 - 20	21 - 50	51 - 100	>100
Volunteers	11.3%	12.5%	21.3%	20.0%	18.8%	7.5%	8.8%

Paid staff	42.4%	32.9%	7.1%	8.2%	3.5%	3.5%	2.4%
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11.3% of the organisations surveyed said that they do not have volunteers at all working for them, while 42.4% had no paid staff. The largest group of volunteers working at organisations is the grouping of 11 to 20 people, whilst the largest group for paid staff is the group of one to five people.


2.5 Financial and technological resources

This sub-dimension examines the financial sustainability and technological resources of CSOs. It examines the change in revenue and expenses between the current and previous year, and the availability of certain technologies.

2.5.1 Financial sustainability

Organisations were asked whether revenues and expenses have increased or decreased, in comparison to the previous year. In relation to revenues, 51.9% of organisations remained the same, 25.3% decreased and 22.8% increased. For expenses, 45.5% increased, 44.2% stayed the same and 10.4% decreased. Since Cyprus has experienced the heavy burden of economic crisis, it was expected that for more organisations, income would have been decreased; however, at present rather they report higher expenses.

Figure 2.16: Change in organisations' revenues and expenses in comparison with the previous year



2.5.2 Technological resources

Over 81% of organisations surveyed have regular access to a telephone, fax, computer and internet, which verifies the very good telecommunication infrastructure of Cyprus and corresponds favourably to the high level of access of GCC citizens to telecommunication resources.

Table 5: Percentage of organisations with regular access to technologies

Category	Yes, regularly	Yes, but only sporadically	No
Telephone line	88.6%	4.5%	6.8%
Fax machine	81.8%	8.0%	10.2%
Computer	86.4%	4.5%	9.1%
Internet connection	85.2%	1.1%	13.6%

2.6 International linkages

This sub-dimension measures the percentage of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) based in Cyprus to the total of INGOs globally. According to the Union of International Associations database in Cyprus, 10.6% of INGOs are represented in the country (Union of International Associations Database).

Conclusion

The scores for the sub-dimensions of internal governance, support infrastructure, sectoral communication and financial and technological resources are very high, ranging from 74.8 to 98.9. However, in direct comparison, the human resources and international linkages scores are extremely low.

It can be assumed that not all organisations in the GCC are as structured or organised as indicated by the outcomes of the CSI, as a high number of them are not listed in telephone directories or such, and it was not possible for the research team to reach them.

Most CSOs do not have the necessary human resources to adequately fulfil their mission, scope or intended services. Support mechanisms and infrastructure are necessary for CSOs with more limited capacity. Some ideas provided during consultations for the CSI included extending the support services offered by the NGO Support Centre, creating similar support centres in other areas and to operate the 'House of CSOs', a building to be used as an office, meeting and library area to assist smaller, struggling CSOs.

Many CSOs do not have sufficient funding and need to expand their funding sources. New sources of funding are available, such as from the European Union and EEA Grants (the EEA Grants are jointly financed by Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway and provide funding for social and economic development projects in 15 European countries) and some organisations are able to benefit fully from them. In 2008, the UNDP-ACT programme moved into its second phase and funding has been further focused. Private companies, however, have unfortunately reduced funding to CSOs due to the economic crisis.

The NGO Support Centre contributes to the capacity building of civil society through the provision of consulting services and training on management and organisation. From 2006 the Centre, in cooperation with the Management Centre, operated two UNDP-ACT funded programmes, the Cypriot Civil Society Strengthening Programme and ENGAGE. The Capacity Building Programme aimed at strengthening the capacity of CSOs to advance civic engagement in Cyprus, and create opportunities to promote community participation, cooperation, dialogue and trust within the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. The ENGAGE programme aims at developing a strong partnership strategy by building on people-to-people contacts, as well as formal and informal networks with leading members of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities.

Furthermore, the research offices of local universities and the NGO Support Centre provide guidance, support and training services mainly for funding opportunities, proposal writing and project management.

3. PRACTICE OF VALUES

Civil society is made up of many different forces, often contradictory, or which do not always practice what they preach. CIVICUS identified some key practices that are deemed crucial in gauging not only the endorsement of certain progressive values, but also the extent to which civil society's practices are coherent with their ideals. The score for this dimension is 46.0%. During CSI 2005, a similar dimension scored 1.9 out of 3, which can be recalculated to 63.3%. However, a direct comparison between the two scores is not possible because the methodology and the sub-dimensions are not the same.

Table 6: Practice of Values sub-dimension scores


		Score (%)
3	Practice of Values	46.1
3.1	Democratic decision-making governance	92.9
3.2	Labour regulations	28.4
3.3	Code of conduct and transparency	44.1
3.4	Environmental standards	22.2
3.5	Perception of values in civil society as a whole	43.1

3.1 Democratic decision-making governance

This section looks at how decisions are taken within CSOs and in addition, who takes those decisions.

In 84.5% of the organisations that participated in the CSI Organisational Survey, key decisions are taken by an elected board, in 7.1% by an appointed board, in 6.0% by the members and in 2.4% by a single elected leader.

Figure 2.17: Who takes key decisions in organisations




3.2 Labour regulations

In this sub-dimension, the existence of policies regarding equal opportunities, staff membership, staff membership in labour unions, training in labour rights for new staff and a publicly available statement on labour standards are examined.

3.2.1 Equal opportunities

78.6%, a vast majority of organisations, do not have a written policy regarding equal opportunity and / or equal pay for equal work for women.


Figure 2.18 Percentage of organisations with written policies regarding equal opportunity and/or equal pay for women



3.2.2 Members of labour unions

In the organisations that employ personnel, 38.5% have at least one labour union member and 61.5% have no employee who is a labour union member. 2.6% of the organisations have one to 30% labour union membership of their staff, 10.3% have 31-50% membership, 5.2% have 51-80% and 20.5% have 81-100% membership.

Figure 2.19: Percentage of paid staff within organisations who are members of labour unions



3.2.3 Labour rights training

Regarding labour rights training, research revealed that 72.2% of the organisations do not conduct specific training on labour rights for new staff members; only 27.8% do.

3.2.4 Publicly available policies for labour standards

A publicly available policy for labour standards is available in only 32.7% of the organisations that participated in the CSI Organisational Survey.

3.3 Code of conduct and transparency

During the CSI research process, participants were asked whether their CSOs make their codes of conduct publicly available and help to ensure financial transparency through publicly available financial reports. A publicly available code of conduct is available in only 28.3% of the organisations, while 73% of the organisations with no code of conduct do not plan to implement one. Organisational financial reports were publicly available in 59.8% of the organisations.

3.4 Environmental standards

This indicator evaluates the extent to which CSOs have written policies for environmental management and practices such as recycling. A small number (22.2%) answered positively, while only 22.0% of the organisations without an environmental policy are considering adopting one in future. Such standards are a rather new idea and somewhat unknown in Cyprus. Despite the small numbers, it is felt that many more organisations practice some environmental actions such as recycling, water waste reduction and energy saving, without having formal written policies.


3.5 Perception of values in civil society as a whole

Civil society is assumed to promote and spread such values as democracy, tolerance, peace, non-violence and transparency. This sub-dimension measures how widely CSOs perceive that these values are practiced within the GCC civil society.

3.5.1 Perceived non-violence

An unexpectedly high 89.5% of CSOs believe that there are forces within civil society that use violence to express their interests.

Figure 2.20: Percentage of CSO representatives who believe that there are forces within civil society that use violence to express their interests



According to 52.6% of the respondents, forces that use violence are isolated groups that occasionally resort to violence, while 35.1% believe that they are isolated but regularly use violence, and 10.5% stated that that the use of violence by civil society groups is extremely rare.

Between 2005 and 2010, new and significant social issues have been added to civil society's agenda. These include multiculturalism, racism, xenophobia, rights of minority groups, delinquency and the weakening of traditional family values. European Union values seem to have a limited effect on the majority of the GCC population. Instead, conservative values, relative to the social issues mentioned above, appear to prevail. Some survey respondents stated that even though the GCC population is well-educated, frequently travels abroad and has a high quality of life, people's beliefs on issues such as immigration, minority and immigrant rights, homosexuality and euthanasia tend to be very conservative. For the first time, organised civil society groups are working against excessive immigration, political refugee rights and illegal immigration. In 2010, at least three racist incidents took place in the country, with the latest on 6 November 2010, when demonstrators against immigration clashed with immigrants participating in a festival and 13 people were injured (Politis online, 2010). In addition, fans of various sports teams have been involved in violent acts and hooliganism very frequently over the last few years.

Table 7: Description of the forces within civil society that use violence to further their interests

Category	%
Significant mass-based groups	1.6
Isolated groups regularly using violence	35.1
Isolated groups occasionally resorting to violence	52.6
Use of violence by civil society groups is extremely rare	10.5

3.5.2 Perceived internal democracy

This indicator scored 67.5%. In assessing civil society's current role in promoting democratic decision-making within their own organisations and groups, 41.3% of CSO respondents characterised this role as significant, 26.3% as moderate and 25.0% as limited.

3.5.3 Perceived levels of corruption

Instances of corruption within civil society are perceived to be rare for only 9.7% of organisations, occasional for 26.4%, frequent for 43.1% and very frequent for 20.8%.

3.5.4 Perceived intolerance

Researchers inquired whether organisations knew any examples of forces within civil society that were explicitly racist, discriminatory or intolerant. 7.6% stated that they knew many examples, 50.0% knew several examples, 37.9% knew only one or two examples and 4.5% did not know any example of situations of intolerance.

3.5.5 Perceived weight of intolerant groups

A further question was asked to evaluate if there are forces within civil society that are explicitly racist, discriminatory or intolerant and how important these groups are within civil society. More than half (58.1%) believed that those forces are a marginal actor within civil society, with 29.0% believing the situation to be contrary, that these forces are significant. 8.1% stated that they were completely isolated and strongly denounced by civil society at large. Lastly, a small 4.8% felt that they dominated civil society.

3.5.6 Perceived promotion of non-violence and peace

This CSI indicator assesses the strength of the promotion of non-violence and peace by civil society. The results show that 40.0% believed that civil society has a significant role in this respect, 22.4% felt that it has a moderate role and 29.4% that it is limited. 8.2% of organisations stated that this role is insignificant.

4. PERCEPTION OF IMPACT

This section looks at the level of impact that civil society has on policy and social issues, as well as on attitudes within society as a whole. This perceived impact is examined from the perspective of both civil society representatives (internal perceptions) and from expert external stakeholders belonging to other sectors, such as the state, private sector, the media, academia, or donor organisations (external perceptions). The score for this dimension is an average 53.3%. This perceived impact is assessed along the following sub-dimensions:

1. Responsiveness (internal and external), in other words, civil society's impact on the most important social concerns within the GCC.
2. Social impact (both internal and external), namely civil society's impact on society in general.
3. Policy impact (internal and external), covering civil society's impact on policy in general, the policy activism of CSOs, and the impact of CSO activism on selected policy issues.
4. Impact on attitudes, including trust, public spiritedness and tolerance, as well as the level of public trust in civil society.

Table 8: Perception of Impact sub-dimension scores

		Score (%)
4	Perception of Impact	53.3
4.1	Responsiveness (internal perception)	51.6
4.2	Social impact (internal perception)	78.0

4.3	Policy impact (internal perception)	48.6
4.4	Responsiveness (external perception)	45.7
4.5	Social impact (external perception)	76.8
4.6	Policy impact (external perception)	52.2
4.7	Impact of civil society on attitudes	20.2

4.1 Responsiveness (internal perception)

This sub-dimension analyses civil society's impact on two very important social concerns within the GCC by analysing answers from the CSI Organisational Survey. For the GCC the two most important concerns selected were the Cyprus problem and the financial crisis.

The score is 51.6, indicating that around half of the civil society representatives surveyed believe that civil society has some or even a high level of impact on these topics. In relation to the Cyprus situation, a topic that has monopolised the Cypriot social and political scene for almost 50 years, the perceived impact was high for only 19.8%; while 32.1% felt it was limited. Very similar was the outcome for the financial crisis, a recent but very important issue for the island. Approximately four out of ten respondents stated that the impact on the two issues was very limited: 44.4% for the Cyprus problem and 38.8% for the financial crisis.

Table 9: Impact on most important social concerns (internal perceptions)

	Social concern	No impact	Very limited impact	Some tangible impact	High level of impact
1	The Cyprus problem	3.7%	44.4%	32.1%	19.8%
2	Financial crisis in Cyprus	10.0%	38.8%	32.5%	18.8%

4.2 Social impact (internal perception)

Each organisation that participated in the CSI Organisational Survey selected two fields in which they felt their organisation had exerted most impact; they were required to assess both their organisation's impact and civil society's impact as a whole on these two fields. This sub-dimension had the highest score (78.0%) and verifies that GCC civil society exerts more impact on social issues, compared to policies. Education and social development topped the list of fields with the highest impact, with 26.5% and 16.8% respectively. Other fields, by order, were support to poor and marginalised communities, health, the reconciliation process and humanitarian relief.

Table 10: Top six fields in which organisations exert most impact (internal perceptions)

Rank	Category	% of organisations (possible up to two answers)
1	Education	26.5
2	Social development	16.8
3	Supporting poor and marginalised communities (e.g. people with disabilities)	11.0
4	Health	9.7
5	Reconciliation process	9.0
6	Humanitarian relief	8.4

Overall, civil society assesses itself as having more impact as a sector on education than social development, since as the table below shows, high and relative impact categories received 81% for education and 73% for social development. Limited impact was low, with 19% and 25% respectively.

Table 11: Assessment of civil society's impact on the two fields with most impact (internal perceptions)

	Fields (% of answers)	
Assessment	Education	Social development
No impact	0	0
Limited impact	19	25
Some tangible impact	53	46
High level of impact	28	29

Further, organisations' representatives assessed the impact of their own organisation on education and social development. Education maintains its primary impact role compared to social development since high and some impact receive 83% for education and 73% for social development. Limited impact remains low, with 15% and 27% respectively.


Table 12: Assessment of own organisation's impact on the two fields with most impact (internal perceptions)

	Fields (% of answers)	
Assessment	Education	Social development
No impact	2	0
Limited impact	15	27
Some tangible impact	37	38
High level of impact	46	35

Comparing the assessment given by the respondents for the sector as a whole and for their own organisation, there is little difference if we compare the total percentage of the people who stated at least some tangible impact. In particular, 81.0% and 75.0% of the representatives said that civil society has at least some tangible impact in education and social development respectively, while a similar 83.0% and 73.0% reported this for their own organisation. However, if we compare the percentages for high level of impact for both fields, there was a higher percentage of representatives who gave such evaluation for the impact of their own organisation than the impact of civil society as a whole.

4.3 Policy impact (internal perception)

This section covers civil society's impact on policy in general, the policy activism of CSOs and the impact of CSO activism on selected policy issues. Findings are based on the data from the CSI Organisational Survey. In assessing the impact of GCC civil society on Cyprus' policy-making, 81.6% felt that impact was very limited or moderate and only 12% that this impact level was high.


Figure 2.21: Impact of civil society on policy-making (internal perceptions)

Almost four out of ten organisations (38%) were active in advocating for new policies or for reformation of existing policies during the last two years. Ten different fields were identified in which attempts to influence policy were made, with education, human rights / immigrants issues and sports being the top three. Health, labour, women issues and legal fields followed. Surprisingly, social issues and the environment, two fields in which civil society is expected to have an important role, did not seem to see many policies pushed for approval.

Table 13: Fields of policy in which organisations have pushed for approval

Ranking	Field	% of total policies pushed for approval
1	Education	20.0
2	Human rights/immigrant issues	15.0
3	Sports	12.5
4	Health	10.0
5	Labour Issues	10.0
6	Women issues	7.5
7	Legal	7.5
8	Social Issues	5.0
9	Environment	5.0
10	Culture	5.0
11	Other	2.5

Usually all policies made by civil society are discussed prior to a final decision, and no example of a policy that was not listened by politicians was reported. Many policies were under discussion, with 25-40% approved and some rejected. Regarding education, 20% of proposed policies were rejected, 40% were under discussion at the time of the survey and another 40% were approved. When it comes to human rights and immigrant issues, 33.3% of the policies were under discussion and 66.7% were approved. Finally, 75% of proposed sports policies were under discussion and 25% approved.

Figure 2.22: Top three fields of policy and their outcome (internal perceptions)

4.4 Responsiveness (external perception)

This sub-dimension analyses civil society's impact on the two very important social concerns mentioned above, the Cyprus problem and the financial crisis in Cyprus, as expressed by external stakeholders in the CSI External Perceptions Survey. The majority (57.2%) of expert external stakeholders stated that there is none or very limited impact on the Cyprus problem and 31.4% that the impact is moderate. The opinion of impact on the financial crisis did not differ dramatically, since 51.6% characterised civil society's impact as non-existent or very limited and 39.4% as moderate.


Table 14: Impact on most important social concerns (external perceptions)

#	Social concern	No impact	Very limited impact	Some tangible impact	High level of impact
1	The Cyprus problem	2.9%	54.3%	31.4%	11.4%
2	Financial crisis in Cyprus	15.2%	36.4%	39.4%	9.1%

For the Cyprus problem, the internal perception is that impact is higher than the external perception, because 51.9% of organisations' leaders considered the impact to be moderate or high, compared to 42.8% of external stakeholders. Related to the financial crisis, the internal perception for high impact was more than double the external perception.

4.5 Social impact (external perception)

64.7% of external stakeholders felt that civil society has had some tangible impact on the social context, 32.4% that it is limited and 2.9% that the impact is high.

Figure 2.23: Impact of civil society on the social context (external perceptions)

Each external stakeholder identified two social fields that they believed civil society to have been most active in. Humanitarian support and support for poor and marginalised communities were the top two most active fields followed by education, social development, employment and health.

Table 15: Top six fields in which civil society has been most active (external perceptions)

Rank	Category	% of external stakeholders (possible up to two answers)
1	Humanitarian relief	28.6
2	Supporting poor and marginalised communities	20.6
3	Education	12.7
4	Social development	11.1
5	Employment	11.1
6	Health	9.5

Civil society was perceived to have a high level of impact in supporting poor and marginalised communities by 27% of respondents, and some tangible impact for a high 67% of the group. Despite humanitarian relief being judged as an area where civil society is more active, its impact was perceived as less, with 54% claiming that the impact was somewhat tangible and 21% that was high.

Table 16: Assessment of civil society's impact on the top two fields in which civil society has been most active (external perceptions)


Assessment	Fields (% of answers)	
	Humanitarian relief	Supporting poor and marginalised communities
No impact	0	0
Limited impact	15	6

Some tangible impact	54	67
High level of impact	31	27

4.6 Policy impact (external perception)


This section covers civil society's impact on policy in general, the policy activism of CSOs and the impact of CSO activism on selected policy issues. These findings are based on the data of the CSI External Perceptions Survey.

Figure 2.24: Impact of civil society on policy-making (external perceptions)



14.3% of those surveyed believed that civil society has no impact on Cyprus' policy-making. 45.7% of the sample said that its impact was limited and 31.4% felt it had some tangible impact. The three fields of policy that civil society is considered most active in are social issues, humanitarian relief and labour issues. Social issues, together with humanitarian relief, were selected by 12.4% of the external stakeholders, and labour issues by 11.4%. 30.8% of proposed social issue policies were rejected, 38.5% were under discussion and 30.7% were approved. Concerning humanitarian relief, 23.1% of the policies were under discussion and 76.9% of policies were approved. Labour issue policies had the highest percentage for the category of policy under discussion at 66.7%, with the remaining 33.3% approved.

Figure 2.25: Top three fields of proposed policy and their outcome (external perceptions)



The power of political parties over civil society is still very strong and they maintain this impact. The Advisory Committee members commented that the political environment during the period of 2004 to 2007 and the control of some political parties over CSOs had a negative impact on organisations, especially bi-communal and reconciliation groups. Since 2008, the political environment has become more enabling. More politicians recognise the significant role of CSOs in society; the current presidency, for example, encourages activities that promote understanding and reunification and has adopted policies and actions towards peace-building and reconciliation.


A few CSOs focus on trying to hold the state accountable to its responsibilities, or in informing and trying to mobilise the public to do so, such as KISA – Action for Equality Support, Antiracism, environmental groups, health organisations and women's rights groups. In many cases, accountability is exercised in an indirect way in order to avoid direct confrontation with authorities. A new tool for local CSOs is the internet, helping them to mobilise through emails, websites and blogs.

During the same period, a number of CSOs identified limitations in the legal framework for organisations in the Greek Cypriot Community, as well as discrepancies from international requirements; they advocated for the Republic to amend the legal framework. The Planning Bureau, as the administrator of Cyprus international development aid (CyprusAid), identified gaps in legislation and took the responsibility to commission a consultant to assess the legal framework (Planning Bureau 2008). UNDP-ACT funded a study which was assigned to the European Centre for Not-For Profit Law (Planning Bureau 2008). A report submitted by the European Centre for Not-For Profit Law concluded that the current legislation should be reformed and modernised (European Centre for Not-For Profit Law 2008). Draft legislation on the registration and management of 'public benefit organisations' was prepared and it is expected will go out public consultation.

4.7 Impact of civil society on attitudes

The last sub-dimension compares results for certain attitudes such as trust, tolerance and public spiritedness between members of organisations and non-members. The comparison between active members and inactive members of non-members civil society regarding trust shows that 27% of active CSO members believe that most people can be trusted, compared to 12% of inactive or non-members. This suggests a positive contribution of civil society to public trust.

Figure 2.26: Trust in people



Tolerance levels were also compared in the same way. The results show that in six out of ten categories, active CSO members have higher tolerance levels than non-members. CSO members show encouraging tolerance rates towards Turkish Cypriots and immigrants.

Table 17: Difference in tolerance between CSO members and non-members

#	Group of people	Would not mind to have as neighbours (%)		Would not like to have as neighbours (%)	
		Members	Non-members	Members	Non-members
1	Drug addicts	20.3	21	79.7	79
2	People of different race	82.2	75.4	17.8	24.6
3	People who have HIV/AIDS	59.2	59.5	40.8	40.5
4	Immigrants/foreign workers	75.8	69.4	24.2	30.6
5	Homosexuals	56.6	58.9	43.4	41.1
6	People of a different religion	86.2	86.6	13.8	13.4
7	Heavy drinkers	33.1	26.7	66.9	73.3
8	Unmarried couples living together	95.4	93.6	4.6	6.4
9	People who speak a different language	95.4	93	4.6	7
10	Turkish Cypriots	73.8	67.3	26.2	32.7

However, when it comes to public spiritedness, or disapproval of behaviours such as cheating on taxes, apparently there is no significant difference between members and non-members of CSOs.

Table 18: Average scoring by CSO members and non-members for certain actions

#	Action	How justifiable it is (scoring: min=1, max=10)	
		Members	Non-members
1	Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled	1.7	1.5
2	Avoiding a fare on public transport	2.2	1.8
3	Cheating on taxes if you have a chance	2.2	2.0
4	Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties	1.5	1.4
5	Homosexuality	4.1	3.8
6	Prostitution	2.6	2.2
7	Abortion	2.9	2.4
8	Divorce	5.1	4.6
9	Euthanasia	3.3	2.7
10	Suicide	1.7	1.7
11	Gender-based violence	1.2	1.3
12	Illegal drug use	1.6	1.4
13	Alcohol abuse	1.8	1.4
14	Gambling	1.7	1.8

The CSI also assessed public trust in civil society, compared to trust in other sectors. The most trustworthy institution was the church, with 33.3% of respondents trusting it a great deal. Next were charitable or humanitarian organisations with 21.2% and thirdly, the armed forces at 19.9%. The least trustworthy institutions were television stations, with only 4.4% of respondents trusting them a great deal, followed by political parties at 4.9% and major companies at 5.2%.



Figure 2.27: Levels of trust in institutions

Figure 2.28 Institutions in order by level of trust

5. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

The last dimension examines the environment that civil society operates in. The score was calculated to be 77.1%, which is the highest among all of the CSI dimensions. This section is divided into three sub-dimensions for the socio-economic, socio-political and socio-cultural contexts. Secondary data, as well as data from the CSI Organisational Survey, were used to complete this dimension.

Table 19: External Environment sub-dimension scores

		Score (%)
5	External Environment	77.1
5.1	Socio-economic context	81.6
5.2	Socio-political context	91.0
5.3	Socio-cultural context	58.7

5.1 Socio-economic context

The socio-economic context indicators derive from a range of sources that provide information about a country's level of social development, corruption, inequality and macro-economic health.

5.1.1 Basic Capabilities Index

The Social Watch Basic Capabilities Index (BCI)⁶ assesses the percentage of children who reach fifth grade at school, the percentage of children who survive until at least their fifth year and the percentage of births attended by health professionals. The BCI does not use income as an indicator. The score is out of 100, with a high score indicating that most of the population's basic needs are satisfied. The GCC scored 96 for the year 2010, which is characterised as a medium BCI.

⁶ <http://www.socialwatch.org/node/11389>.

5.1.2 Corruption

The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)⁷ ranks countries according to the perception of corruption in the public sector. In particular, it captures information about the administrative and political aspects of corruption from surveys and assessments. These include questions relating to the bribery of public officials and kickbacks in public procurement, and questions aiming to determine the strength and effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption efforts. The GCC global ranking for 2010 was 28, the regional ranking being 17, and the CPI score was 6.3 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean).

5.1.3 Inequality

The Gini Coefficient⁸ is used to measure the level of inequality in a nation. A coefficient of zero means perfect equality and everyone having the same income, whilst 100 means perfect inequality, or that one person has all the income and everybody else has nothing. The Gini Coefficient for the Greek Cypriot community for 2005 was 29. For the CSI project, the indicator is reversed in order to match the direction of the CSI indicators where a higher score is more positive, and as a result, the CSI indicator has a score of 71 (110 – 29). In comparison with Europe's average score in 2005 of 31, the GCC's score of 29 indicates that it did a little better. In 1997, the Gini Coefficient was also 29, while in 2003 it was 27.

5.2 Socio-political context

This sub-dimension depicts basic features of the political system in Cyprus, and their potential repercussions for civil society. It is calculated from a set of indicators which come partly from external databases and partly from the CSI Organisational Survey. It analyses state effectiveness, political rights and freedoms, as well as the characteristics of the legal framework for civil society.

The CSI makes use of the Freedom House Freedom in the World Survey⁹ to add to and deepen the data from the CSI Organisational Survey. The Freedom in the World Survey provides an annual evaluation of the state of global freedom as experienced by individuals. The survey measures freedom as the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of government and other centres of potential domination, according to two broad categories of political rights and civil liberties, as analysed below.

5.2.1 Political rights and freedoms

Based on the Freedom in the World survey 2010, the GCC has a score of 38 out of 40, or an equivalent 95 out of 100. Countries with this score enjoy a wide range of political rights, including free and fair elections. Candidates who are elected do assume power, political parties are competitive, the opposition plays an important role and enjoys real power, and minority groups have reasonable self-government or can participate in government through informal consensus.

5.2.2 Rule of law and personal freedoms

This data was once again taken from the Freedom in the World Survey 2010. Three out of the four indexes which form the Index of Civil Liberties were used for this project. These include rule of law, personal autonomy, individual rights, freedom of expression and belief. The higher the score, the higher the level of rights. The score for the GCC was 56 out of 60, or an equivalent 93 out of 100, indicating a healthy state of personal freedoms and rights in the country. This is an encouraging sign for the future growth and health of civil society.

⁷ http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results.

⁸ <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu>, extraction: 11.03.2007.

⁹ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=276>.


5.2.3 Associational and organisational rights

The associational and organisational rights index is the fourth indicator which forms the Index of Civil Liberties. In a scale of 1 to 12, the GCC scored 11. This is almost the maximum value, which again reinforces the positive trends and developments evident in GCC civil society.

5.2.4 Experience of legal framework

38.8% of organisations surveyed in the CSI Organisational Survey felt that Cyprus' laws for civil society were neutral, while the same percentage characterised them as moderately enabling. 3.0% believed the laws to be highly restrictive, but another 3.0% believe that they are fully enabling. A 16.4% stated that the laws are quite limiting. In a question which asked organisations whether they had ever faced any illegitimate restriction or attack by local or central government, 96.5% answered they had not and only 3.5% said yes. This is yet another healthy indication that civil society does not face intimidation or abuse by the state, but rather is left to operate according to their own principles.

Figure 2.29: Assessment of organisations of Cyprus' laws for civil society



5.2.5 State effectiveness

The state's effectiveness is seen as the extent to which a state is able to fulfil its defined and required functions. This indicator score is derived from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. The GCC has a score of 77.4 out of 100. The higher the score, the more effective the state is assumed to be.


5.3 Socio-cultural context

The socio-cultural context sub-dimension looks at aspects of interpersonal trust as a broad measure of the social psychological climate for association and cooperation. Interpersonal trust is the level of trust that the ordinary people feel for each other. Similarly, the extent of tolerance and public spiritedness offer indications on the context in which civil society unfolds.

5.3.1 Trust


85.5% of the population stated that they needed to be very careful when it came to trusting other people, while a low 14.5% felt that most people could be trusted.

Figure 2.30: Trust between people



5.3.2 Tolerance

Figure 2.31: Groups of people that respondents would like or not like to have as neighbours




A question in the CSI Population Survey asked interviewers whether they would not like to have certain groups of people as their neighbours. The least favourable group of people was drug addicts with 79.1% negative answers. Second highest were heavy drinkers and the third least favourable group were homosexuals. On the other hand, the group of people that most people would not mind having as neighbours, with a high response rate of 94.0%, was unmarried couples living together. Second were people who speak a different language, at 93.6%, and third people of a different religion, at 86.5%.

5.3.3 Public spiritedness

People were asked to justify certain actions. Results showed that people gave an average rating of below 5 in all actions. The most justified action seems to be divorce, with an average grade of 4.9 on a scale 1 to 10, then homosexuality with 3.9 average and third euthanasia at 3.0.

Figure 2.32: Justification of certain actions



IV. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CYPRUS – GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

This section summarises some key strengths and weaknesses of civil society in the GCC, identified at regional focus groups and at the CSI national workshop, as well as by individuals interviewed as part of the research process, and the research results and insights from the previous CSI study.

STRENGTHS:

Civic Engagement

1. There is interest from young people in being members of certain types of CSO groups, such as environmental groups.
2. Most active organisations have a small team of very dedicated and experienced volunteers.
3. Greek Cypriots are very social (76.5% spend time with friends weekly or nearly every week), so civil society can use this advantage to increase civic engagement.
4. The representation of women and young people (age group 18 to 24 years) in social and political organisations is quite strong.

Level of Organisation

1. Over 98% of the organisations have an elected board of directors or a formal steering committee.
2. More than 80% of organisations belong to a federation, umbrella group or support network.
3. It is very common for CSOs to communicate and cooperate with other organisations.
4. The vast majority of CSOs have a regular access to telephone line, computer and internet.

Practice of Values

1. Decisions in CSOs are taken democratically, usually by an elected board.
2. There are no major reported cases of corruption within GCC civil society.
3. Civil society leaders strongly believe that CSOs have a significant role in issues such as peace, non violence, tolerance and transparency.

Perception of Impact

1. A major reform of legislation for CSOs is underway. In the past few years a number of CSOs identified limitations in the legal framework as well as discrepancies from international requirements and advocated for the government of Republic of Cyprus to amend the current legislation.
2. The political environment is more enabling the last three years. More politicians recognise the significant role of CSOs and the cases of cooperation between government officials and CSOs for new policies is increasing.
3. In the fields of education and social development, civil society has significant impact.

External Environment

1. The external environment is very positive and therefore enables civil society to develop.

WEAKNESSES:

Civic Engagement

1. There are relatively low rates of active membership of social and political CSOs.
2. In the last few years it has become more difficult for CSOs to attract active members.

3. Voluntary assistance to organisations is low, and this assistance is based on a small number of individuals. In general, members of organisations volunteer for short duration assignments.
4. In small and medium size communities a very small number of individuals organise and participate in civil society activities. Furthermore the same small number holds leadership positions in multiple organisations.
5. Ethnic and linguistic minorities are severely underrepresented in organisations and older people (age group over 64 years) are somewhat underrepresented.

Level of Organisation

1. Despite the fact that over 80% of organisations are members of an umbrella group the level of communication, cooperation and trust is only medium. In general there is mistrust on behalf of organisations towards federations and umbrella organisations.
2. CSOs are not financially strong enough to employ permanent personnel and therefore they rely on volunteers.
3. For most CSOs expenses are increasing or staying the same and at the same time income is decreasing or staying the same. The opportunities for raising funds from private organisations have significantly reduced in the last two years.

Practice of Values

1. Most organisations do not have and do not plan to establish a code of conduct, internal regulations or policies for equal opportunities and labour standard. Some CSO experts argue that due to the small size of GCC CSOs and their culture it is not easy to implement such regulations.
2. The reported cases of violence within civil society have increased the last five years. That is why an amazingly high number of CSO leaders (89.5%) believe that there are forces within civil society that use violence to express their interests.
3. The beliefs of Greek Cypriots in issues such as immigration, minority, immigrant rights and homosexuality are very conservative, and these will take many years to change.

Perception of Impact

1. Political parties have a very strong influence on civil society and control many CSOs.
2. Only a few CSOs seek to hold the state accountable to its responsibilities. In many cases accountability is promoted in indirect ways in order to avoid confrontation with authorities.
3. Policy impact remains limited and in many cases the opinion of civil society does not influence decision makers.
4. The impact of civil society on the Cyprus problem is very limited.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS – GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

- Organise a wide network platform to monitor legal reform for CSOs. It would also be beneficial to initiate a dialogue with policy makers, including political parties and relevant authorities. Civil society needs to be active and present draft legislation to a wide number of CSOs and other such groups from across Cyprus to get their feedback before tabling this with government.
- All parties need to assure that the new legislation is simple and up-to-date regarding representation and enhancement of such major issues as democratic decision-making, equal opportunities, codes of conduct, transparency concerns and mechanisms, tolerance and other values. All groups need to assess how best to influence policy-making and change the environment in which civil society operates.
- All stakeholders need to promote the role of civil society in rural areas.
- Certain leading groups within civil society need to provide training and support to CSOs based outside of the capital, Nicosia. The example provided in the report, the NGO Support Centre, could assign civil society experts to visit alternating outlying communities on a regular basis in order to provide guidance and support to local, rural CSOs.
- The principle core values of civil society need to be strengthened and promoted. These include volunteering, democratic culture, tolerance and diversity within the leadership and active membership of CSOs. These must be entrenched in society, and in the activities and practices of civil society in particular.
- Increased training to CSOs needs to be provided, particularly in areas such as how to develop democratic culture, improve volunteering and perform effective project management.
- Cooperation, linkages, cross networking and partnerships need to improve within civil society itself. This also needs to occur between CSOs and the educational system in an effort to develop common programmes, learning exchanges and best practice sharing.
- At a country level, young people, particularly college and university students, need to be encouraged to participate in volunteering activities. This will help to boost the participation rates in this sector and encourage young people to participate in civil society and take ownership of their nation and their society.
- Individuals need to be actively encouraged to become members, not only of traditional CSOs such as sport associations, cultural groups and professional associations, but also of more progressive and newly developed associations and more flexible, less structured associations and networks to again aim to boost participation in civil society.
- Accountability and transparency rates of CSOs need to be encouraged and enhanced, particularly for the ones receiving public funding. This will help to create a culture of openness and transparency, and will help to counter abuses and corruption in the long run.
- Overall, the impact of civil society in Cyprus needs to be improved. This can be achieved in numerous ways, ranging from highlighting and educating the nation as to why a strong civil society is important and vital to the overall health of a country, to presenting best

practices from other countries, and also by explaining and exploring the role of civil society in formulating policies.

- Simultaneously, diversity and tolerance rates need to be actively encouraged and increased.
- Civil society needs to campaign for fair and equal representation and coverage from the media on a diverse range of topics, directly or indirectly affecting members of civil society or organisations. It also needs increasingly to use the media strategically to address new audiences and get its message out.
- In order to achieve this, CSOs could identify journalists and media houses that are progressive or who would like to promote progressive civil society fields and promote positive issues.
- Civil society needs to actively increase its financial and human resource stability and have secured but flexible donors. This could come from funds allocated by the state to support human resources sustainability by employing professional personnel and providing training to them. It could also come from diversifying the donors and donor funding sources that are currently being used.

VI. CONCLUSIONS – GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

Recalling the definition of civil society as *“the arena – outside of the family, the state, and the market – which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests*, we can see that its power and character are determined by the legal provisions in place and the way they are enforced by the state agencies, the way citizens understand their role vis-à-vis the state and the extent to which citizens are aware of the existence and the potential of civil society.

Civil society in the Greek Cypriot community has to cope with control from political parties, and clientilistic relationships between political parties and citizens. The Greek Cypriots tend to think that almost everything has a political cause and that is the role of politicians to deal with almost all issues facing society. Political power, as exercised by the state and political parties, therefore assumes a hegemonic role, controlling not only the economy but also society at large, as is evident in education, the media, cultural production and volunteer organisations (mainly charities), and resulting in the underdevelopment of civil society.

The above conclusions agree with the ones of the 2005 CSI report, which states: “Civil society in the Greek Cypriot Community is of a very particular sort because advocacy, notions of citizenship and social tolerance are still in the process of developing in an island that was only granted independence in 1960, was shaken by inter- and intra-communal conflict, divided by a war, and is still trying to find ways of building a lasting peaceful future for all its inhabitants. The Republic of Cyprus was a polity that was not accepted at the beginning by the majority of its citizens and political parties took some time to take the complexion of parties as we know them in Western democracies. When they did they dominated the entire fabric of social life. Indeed the dominance of the political upon civil society, in particular, and the wider society in general is crucial for understanding the shape of the former.”

The accession of Cyprus into the EU in 2004 was an important milestone for the development of civil society in the Greek Cypriot Community. It helped CSOs participate in a number of EU projects and in European networks. Most importantly, advocacy and human rights emerged as areas of concern and a number of advocacy organisations were established. During the same period, peace building and bi-communal organisations were mobilised for a solution in Cyprus. This resulted in open discussions on the structure and role of civil society, particularly for peace and reconciliation in Cyprus. Two different trends have become established in civil society: the development of 'traditional' social welfare organisations and the relatively 'new' trend for lobbying and advocacy.

Even though in the last three years the political environment has been more enabling and more politicians recognise the significant role of CSOs, very few CSOs focus on holding the state to account to its responsibilities, or in informing and trying to mobilise the public to do so. In many cases, accountability is exercised in an indirect way in order to avoid direct confrontation with authorities.

UNDP-ACT plays a significant role in the development of CSOs, by providing a number of programmes aimed at building the capacity of organisations working towards peace and reconciliation in Cyprus, which continues to impact positively on the level of inter communal engagement.

A very positive and progressive initiative of Greek Cypriot CSOs in cooperation with CyprusAid and UNDP-ACT, was an assessment of the legal and regulatory framework affecting CSOs in the Republic of Cyprus, for the purpose of building a legal framework which is comparable to other member states in Europe, and also with the added benefit of

strengthening the opportunities for increased bi-communal relationships. Draft legislation on the registration and management of 'public benefit organisations' was prepared and it is expected will go out public consultation.

In addition, the majority of CSOs need to improve their internal management and increase civic engagement. In terms of management the analysis concluded that CSOs are not well organised (e.g. in setting goals, preparing action plans, organising finances, providing training), are not financially strong and do not promote core values. CSOs have a small group of active and experienced members that runs the organisation but it is hard to find or maintain new active members and volunteers.

The establishment of a wide network platform is urgently needed in order to monitor legal reform for CSOs, initiate continuous dialogue with policy makers, promote the role of civil society and provide organisational support. The impact of civil society in Cyprus needs to be improved. This can be achieved in numerous ways, ranging from highlighting and educating the nation as to why a strong civil society is vital to the overall health of the country, to presenting best practices from other countries, and also by explaining and exploring the role of civil society in formulating policies.

Unfortunately Greek Cypriot civil society the last five years did not progress sufficiently, since most of the 2005 CSI report's weaknesses on the civil society are still valid. Cyprus needs new and strong players to assist in setting a vision and objectives and reshaping the future of the country. Civil society can play this key role if it claims an active part in decisions that shape the future of Cyprus and becomes independent of political parties. Brave and progressive actions are needed, which include holding the state accountable, publicly introducing solutions to chronic problems, inspiring and actively involving new members, gaining the trust of citizens and strengthening the internal management of CSOs.

VII. CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

1. CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) project defines civil society as:

“The arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests.”

This definition was discussed in length at the first AC meeting in the TCC. There was a long debate with respect to ‘the market’ - whether we can even envisage a public arena that falls outside the market and whether this definition would not exclude trade unions and chambers of commerce. The distinction between individuals/organisations with purely economic profit motives vs. those with economic as well as political motives (e.g. trade unions for minimum wage policies) was emphasised. Some participants also suggested adding “working for ‘public benefit’ (*kamu yararı*) as a necessary component of civil society.” After some discussion on the concept (i.e. how ‘public benefit’ is a relative concept), the group settled on ‘shared interests’ instead. In the end, there was consensus on adopting the CSI definition.

2. HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

The Cyprus Republic was established in 1960 as an independent bi-communal state which had a functional federation character. The independence of the country was guaranteed by Turkey, Greece and the UK. After a proposal by the Greek Cypriot leadership to change the constitution in favour of the majority Greek Cypriots, there was an outbreak of civil war between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities in late 1963. As a result, Turkish Cypriot people were forced into various small enclaves and the Turkish Cypriot authorities in the government had to withdraw from these positions. They declared that the Republic of Cyprus no longer represented the Turkish Cypriot community (TCC), hence starting the construction of a shadow administration that would speak for the TCC. In 1974 The Greek Cypriots experienced another civil war, this time amongst themselves, prompted by an Athens-sponsored coup attempt against the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios. Following this coup and the toppling of Makarios, Turkey intervened invoking the 1960 Treaty of Guarantees.

After a failed attempt to restore the constitution by a new federal structure immediately after the intervention, Turkey started to control the Turkish Cypriot Community and mainly for security reasons two negotiators Rauf Denktas and Glafkos Klerides agreed to have a population exchange moving all Turkish Cypriots into the northern part of the Island and Greek Cypriots to the southern part of the Island. This further institutionalised the prevailing political separation of the two communities by enforcing their physical and geographical separation as well. In 1975 the ‘Autonomous Turkish Administration Assembly of Cyprus’ unilaterally declared the ‘Turkish Federal State of Cyprus’ and started a more formal and systematic institutionalisation of the administrative structure to govern the TCC. Without an institutionalised state structure, particularly between 1964 and 1975, the line between civil society and the state in the TCC became blurred. Most noticeably, the Turkish Defence Organisation (*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, TMT*), established in 1958, as an armed resistance organisation to fight against the growing demand within the GCC for uniting Cyprus with Greece (i.e. *enosis*), became the de-facto law enforcement and military force of the Turkish Cypriot administration 1964-1975. Following the declaration of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,’ recognised only by Turkey, civil society of the TCC took on another unique role: it became the bridge between the Turkish Cypriot Community and the world. Since the authorities of the new establishment were not internationally recognised, in many cases the

international world chose to deal with CSOs as representatives of the TCC. One example of that was with the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, established in 1959 and registered in the Republic of Cyprus, which was authorised with the EU's Green Line Regulation in 2004 to provide trade licenses for goods across the Green Line.¹⁰

Civil society in the TCC has also been playing an important role in the reconciliation process as actors of second track diplomacy. While engaging in peace-building efforts by facilitating bi-communal interactions, even before 2003 when crossing the buffer zone was not allowed, it has also been advocating and lobbying for cooperation at the negotiation table. In 2004, the 'This Country is Ours' (*Bu Memleket Bizim*) Platform - a civil society initiative consisting of unions and political parties - joined forces with the Common Vision initiative, led by the Chamber of Commerce and supported by more than 90 CSOs, and mobilised masses of Turkish Cypriots to go into the streets in favour of the Annan Plan¹¹ and reunification of the island. Although an alternative movement, called the National People's Movement (*Ulusal Halk Hareketi, UHH*), also sprang around that time to convince people to reject the plan, it remained a marginalised movement and was dismissed by most Turkish Cypriots as a creation of 'state' and 'deep state' authorities.

Following the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriot Community and the subsequent entry of Cyprus into the European Union (EU) without incorporating the TCC, despite an overwhelming 'yes' vote in the Turkish Cypriot Community, the EU instituted an aid programme for the TCC. Part of that programme was geared towards civil society with the goal of promoting social and political development, and fostering reconciliation by supporting civil society. The EU, thereby, recognised civil society as a key actor in the TCC and as a legitimate contact point, promoting its development through financial and technical assistance. Focusing on the promotion of bi-communal civil society activities in particular, UNDP-ACT/USAID programs have been playing a similar role on civil society in the TCC.


3. MAPPING OF CIVIL SOCIETY

This section provides a visual overview of civil society and how it is situated within the society at large in the TCC. The map presented below was prepared by the TCC Implementation Team (NIT) and finalised with feedback from the Advisory Committee (AC). After identifying key social forces (i.e. organisations, agencies, groups or individuals that are influential), the NIT categorised them into four sectors - civil society, state, market and 'other'. Each of these forces was also listed as most influential, influential, somewhat influential, or least influential. They were then spatially arranged in such a way that proximity between forces represents close and/or favourable relationships and distance represents weak and/or antagonistic relations. The size of each circle was adjusted to reflect its relative level of influence. The colour of each circle represents the sector each actor belongs to: red, green, orange, and yellow stand for the state, civil society, market, and 'other' respectively.

¹⁰ The Green Line is the 'ceasefire' line dividing the two communities in Cyprus.

¹¹ The Annan Plan was a UN-brokered plan drawn up after intensive negotiations during 2000-2004 between the two leaderships in Cyprus. This plan was put in front of the two communities as two separate referenda by the UN and was named after Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General at the time.

Figure 3.1: Social forces analysis



B-C groups stands for bi-communal groups; KTTO stands for the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce; KTEZO stands for Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Shopkeepers and Artisans; KTSO stands for Cyprus Turkish Chamber of Industry; KTMMOB stands for the Union of the Chambers for Cyprus Turkish Engineers and Architects; p. banks stands for private banks.

It is highly striking and unique that the two social actors that were identified by the NIT and the AC as 'most influential', the Turkish Embassy and the military/police, are both external actors, listed as 'other' by the AC. The Embassy could not be categorised as a state actor since it represents not the state in the TCC but that of Turkey. The military and the police could not be categorised as state actors since both are under the direct command of the armed forces of the Republic of Turkey, both de-facto and de-jure, based on the temporary 10th article of the 'TRNC' constitution. Furthermore, while the EU is identified as one of the 'influential' actors, the UN, the USA, UK, and the Greek Cypriot Community are counted among the 'somewhat influential' social actors in the TCC.

The 'deep state', listed alongside the president, the government, political parties and some CSOs as an 'influential' actor, refers to a covert ultra-nationalist coalition of high-level actors from the intelligence, military, police, judiciary, and the mafia. It is seen as another element through which the Republic of Turkey exerts influence on the TCC. Gambling and casinos, also among the 'influential' actors, are also linked to the 'deep state' through the mafia.

'Influential' social forces include some CSOs as well: teacher unions, the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO) and civil servant unions. The development of trade unions in Cyprus dates back to the 1920s, when the country was still a British colony, and since then

they have been playing an important role as a highly-organised, loud voice in the TCC, not only for the particular interests of labour, but also for the democratisation of the system at large and for the peace process on the island.¹² Within the past decade, we have seen these unions coming together under one platform, as the *Bu Memleket Bizim* (This Homeland is Ours) Platform between 2000 and 2004 and the *Sendikal* (Unions) Platform since 2010, and mobilising the masses for large-scale strikes and demonstrations. Reaction to austerity measures imposed by the government in Ankara was the starting point in both cases. The movement started by the *Bu Memleket Bizim* Platform joined forces with the Common Vision Movement and ended up in a massive call demanding reunification of the island, which translated into an overwhelming yes vote for the Annan Plan among Turkish Cypriots in 2004. Mobilisation by the *Sendikal* Platform culminated in public outcry and two massive demonstrations in February and March 2011, demanding that Turkey withdraws its control over internal matters in the TCC.

Having been established in 1958 and becoming the first Turkish Cypriot organisation to be internationally recognised through its membership in the International Chamber of Commerce, KTTO's role as an economic and commercial bridge between the Turkish Cypriot community and the world became especially important after the outbreak of civil war in 1963 and the isolation of the TCC as a separate, internationally unrecognised entity.¹³ When the EU approved the Green Line Regulation (Council Regulation No 866/2004), it authorised KTTO with licensing and documenting goods that would be exported into the EU through the Green Line which divides the island.

The AC identified 'doctors' as another 'influential' social actor since they belong to a profession that is highly regarded in the community and since most active politicians have traditionally been doctors. Because of their job they get to meet a lot of people and form relationships of trust with them, which makes doctors attractive candidates in elections. The AC also unanimously decided to remove political parties from the list of CSOs since they are actors which, by definition, vie for control of the state apparatus. But for ease of interpretation, both political parties and the media, which also cannot be neatly put into any of the sector categories, were presented as civil society actors in the map. Public benefit CSOs, the Cyprus Turkish Chamber of Industry (KTSO), the Farmers' Union, the Union of the Chambers for Cyprus Turkish Engineers and Architects (KTMMOB), the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Shopkeepers and Artisans (KTEZO), and bi-communal groups are the other civil society actors which the NIT and the AC identified as key social forces, albeit with less influence than the others listed above.

¹² For historical background on the Turkish Cypriot Teachers Union, see http://www.ktos.org/tr_NEW/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=40.

¹³ For historical background on the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, see <http://www.ktto.net/english/history.html>.

VIII. ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CYPRUS FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY


INTRODUCTION

In this section we analyse civil society in the TCC and the context within which it operates based on the indicators measured for the five main dimensions and their sub-dimensions. The methodology used for computing these indicator scores is the same methodology devised for the CSI project, as described in the first chapter of this report. Hence, the results we present are comparable across different communities and countries, including the GCC. In Chapter XII we provide a comparison of the findings from the two communities.

The Civil Society Diamond

The Civil Society Diamond is a graphical representation of the state of civil society, including the environment in which civil society functions. The state of civil society is measured along four core dimensions - Civic Engagement, Level of Organisation, Practice of Values, and Perceived Impact - each of which is composed of various quantitative indicators that are translated into a 0-100 scale. These four dimension scores are used in constructing the diamond. The circle around the diamond is the fifth dimension and represents the External Environment: the larger the circle, the more conducive the social, political, and economic environment is deemed to be for the development and functioning of civil society.

Figure 3.2: The Turkish Cypriot Civil Society Diamond



Civil society in the TCC scores lowest on Civic Engagement, which indicates low levels of participation by individuals in social and political collective actions and CSOs. The three remaining dimensions that make up the diamond all score around 50. The External Environment scores 70.4 and takes the shape of a relatively wide circle around the diamond, which can be loosely interpreted to suggest that the context is suitable for further

development of civil society in terms of higher participation, organisation, practice of democratic values, and impact. Scores for each sub-dimension and indicators that make up these dimensions can be found in Appendix 5

1. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

Table 20: Civic Engagement sub-dimension scores

1. Dimension: Civic Engagement	43.6
1.1 Extent of socially-based engagement	21.1
1.2 Depth of socially-based engagement	70.4
1.3 Diversity of socially-based engagement	34.3
1.4 Extent of political engagement	21.1
1.5 Depth of political engagement	62.5
1.6 Diversity of political engagement	51.5

Civic engagement refers to the participation of individuals in activities in the public arena to advance shared interests, or public goods. These can be primarily social or political in nature, hence the division of this dimension into sub-dimensions of socially-based engagement and political engagement, where the first refers to activities with a social or recreational purpose (e.g. neighbourhood committees and sports clubs) and the latter refers to activities that aim for policy change or social change at a macro-level (e.g. unions and human rights organisations). For each of these areas, three sub-dimensions are measured - extent, depth, and diversity of engagement.

1.1 and 1.4 Extent of engagement

The main factor behind the low Civic Engagement score is the low extent of engagement, both social and political, which reflects the presence of a small group of individuals who are active in civil society. Overall, we find that 10.2% of respondents are active members of one or more social CSO and 11.7% are active members of one or more political CSO.

Table 21 and Table 22 below show active membership levels in CSOs with social/recreational and political motives respectively, using data from the Population Survey conducted for the CSI. We further categorised CSOs with political motives as membership-based interest groups and rights-based advocacy organisations. With the exception of sports clubs, to which the largest volume of active members belongs, membership-based interest groups (e.g. trade unions, professional/occupational organisations) seem to attract the most active members. This is at least in part due to the fact that individuals involved in certain occupations (e.g. architects, engineers, doctors, lawyers) are required by law to register in their relevant chambers or unions. Membership-based organisations such as unions also provide selective benefits (e.g. compensation during strikes, advocacy at the state level when personal interests of a member is at stake, right to join cooperatives) as an incentive to promote membership.

Table 21: Active membership in social CSOs

CSO type	% of respondents
Sports	7.2
Cultural	6.0
Education	5.2
Hobby	4.2
Youth	3.0
Neighbourhood/village committee	2.7

Burial	2.2
Religious/spiritual group	2.0

Table 22: Active membership in political CSOs

CSO Type		% of respondents
Membership-based interest groups	Farmer/fisherman group or coop	5.7
	Trader or business association	5.0
	Professional association	5.7
	Trade union	6.0
	Cooperative, credit or savings group	6.0
Rights-based advocacy organisations	Health group/social service association	4.5
	Women's group	4.0
	NGO/civic group/human rights	2.7
	Ethnic based community group	2.0
	Environmental or conservation organisation	5.7
	Human rights	4.2

Membership in social and rights-based advocacy organisations is lower. This can be attributed both to the lack of material selective benefits and to the relative recent history of such organisations in the TCC, particularly when compared to sports clubs, trade unions, and other professional organisations. This is also a reflection of the structure of society. The population in the TCC continues to socialise mostly through informal networks, with family and friends (see Table 23). As a result, family continues to be at the heart of social support mechanisms and we see a lack of interest in developing more formal, institutionalised support networks (such as for child care, care for the elderly and assistance for the disadvantaged). Historically, neighbours and fellow villagers contributed to this mechanism as well; however, following urbanisation, socio-economic development, and changes in lifestyles, alternative mechanisms and networks (such as civil society that provides social services) have still not developed.

Table 23: Patterns of socialisation


Who people socialise with	% of respondents			
	weekly	once or twice a month	a few times a year	not at all
Parents or other relatives	72.6	16.7	5.5	5.2
Friends	76.1	17.5	2.2	4.2
Colleagues	29.7	23.2	5.2	41.9
People at church/mosque	15.2	9.2	8	67.6
People at sports clubs or voluntary organisations	15.7	13.2	5.7	65.3

Compared with the 2005 CSI results, we even see a downward trend in levels of active membership. For instance, active membership in trade unions dropped from 17% to 6%, from 11% to 6% in cooperatives, and from 9% to 7% in sports clubs. The only increase we see is in active membership in human rights organisations, which rose from 2% to 4%, most

likely as a direct result of the development of more vibrant advocacy CSOs, which have become more active with increased access to international funds in the post-Annan Plan period. Since membership in trade unions in particular is not expected to be fluid, the fall in membership in such organisations has been interpreted by the Advisory Committee as a reflection of a demographic shift due to an influx of immigrant workers, employed in the private sector, in many cases off the record.

A slightly larger portion of the population is choosing to participate in various collective actions as individuals, without associating themselves with any particular organisation (see Figure 3.3). This explains the occurrence of mass demonstrations joined by tens of thousands of people - as much as a fifth of the population according to many estimates¹⁴ - despite low levels of participation in CSOs. This could be reflecting people's lack of trust in CSOs or their unwillingness to make long-term commitments and investments in an organisation or a cause; rather, they are choosing to make one-time articulations of interest at critical turning points.

Figure 3.3 Individual activism




While the ratio of respondents who say they have participated in petitions, boycotts, and peaceful demonstrations is 16%, 12%, and 11.5% respectively, the ratio of respondents who say they would never participate in such activities remains high (54%, 65%, and 55%). Signs of the demographic transformation are seen in responses to this question as well, as the ratio of respondents who have *ever* signed petitions and attended demonstrations have fallen from 35% to 16% and 30% to 11.5%, respectively, compared to the 2005 CSI findings.


1.2, 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6 Depth and diversity of engagement

However, while scores for the extent of engagement are around 21% for both areas, the overall Civic Engagement score rises up to 43.6% as a result of high depth of engagement scores. This indicates that although the number of individuals who are active in civil society is very small, these individuals are generally involved in more than one CSO. As the figure below illustrates, 34% of active members of social CSOs are active in more than one CSO, while 44% of those active in political CSOs are active in more than one political CSO.

¹⁴ See, for example, reports of the large scale rally held on 28 January 2011: <http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/dunya/03/02/kibrisli.turkler.akp.turkiye.degildir.dedi/608640.0/index.html>

Figure 3.4 Depth of engagement

The diversity of engagement reflects the degree to which civil society is representative of different socio-economic, ethnic, gender, age and geographic groups.

Figure 3.5 Diversity of engagement

As shown in the figure above, 34% of active members of social CSOs belong to groups such as women, ethnic minorities or immigrants, people living in rural areas and older people. Political CSOs, on the other hand, are more representative of these traditionally disadvantaged groups; 52% of active members of political CSOs belong to these groups.

Conclusion

Overall, the level of civic engagement turns out to be the weakest link in the status of civil society in the Turkish Cypriot Community. As we discuss above, when compared with the 2005 CSI results, there is substantial decline in the proportion of the population that is actively engaged in civil society, both as members of CSOs and as active individuals. This is particularly striking considering the fact that during the same period CSOs have been thriving with expanded financial opportunities and a more relaxed political environment with the fall of the Denktas regime after 45 years of power.

The AC has pointed to the influx of immigrants and, consequently, the change in the demographic structure of the society living in the Turkish Cypriot Community as a potential explanation of this apparent decline in the extent of civic engagement. In fact, the current Law on Associations bars non-citizens from becoming members of associations, which institutionalises the discriminatory nature of civil society. This is reflected in the low diversity scores, particularly for social civic engagement, calculated with the data from the Population Survey conducted as part of this study.

Part of the apathy towards civic engagement could also be due to a general sense of mistrust in politics, revealed as low levels of confidence in political parties and elected representatives, juxtaposed with high levels of confidence in the military, law enforcement, and the judiciary, which are generally perceived to be independent of party politics. The prevalence of confidence in these organisations is quite surprising given Turkey's control (and the local population's lack of control) of the military and the police in particular, which were also the actors the NIT and the AC identified as the most influential in society (see Figure II.1).¹⁵

2. LEVEL OF ORGANISATION

Table 24: Level of Organisation sub-dimension scores

2. Dimension: Level of Organisation	50.5
2.1 Internal governance	96.6
2.2 Infrastructure	37.9
2.3 Sectoral communication	74.3
2.4 Human resources	8.3
2.5 Financial and technological resources	75.6
2.6 International linkages	10.6

This dimension combines six sub-dimensions that measure how well CSOs are internally organised, the extent of networking and cooperation across CSOs, and the resources they have access to. While internal governance - the percentage of CSOs that have a formal governance and management system - scored the highest, human resources - the percentage of organisations in which volunteers constitute less than 25% of their staff base - scored the lowest (while 92% of CSOs have volunteers, only 36% have professional staff). International linkages, or rather the lack thereof, also pulled the overall dimension score down. The sub-dimension representing the percentage of CSOs that belong to a platform (infrastructure) also scored low. Financial and technological resources scored an impressive 75.6, meaning an average of 75.6% of the organisations sampled consider they have sufficient technological resources and a stable financial base.

2.1 Internal governance

96.6% of CSOs surveyed have a formal board of directors or a formal steering committee. Due to changes in methodology, it is not possible to directly compare dimension scores calculated here with those from the 2005 CSI. Nevertheless, overall we see major progress

¹⁵ When we analysed the effects of ethnicity on levels of confidence towards different agencies, we see some statistically significant differences, albeit small: while 87% of the respondents who identified themselves as 'Turkish Cypriot' expressed 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot' of confidence in the armed forces, those who expressed the same views of people who identified themselves as 'Turk' was 97%. There was no difference between different ethnic identities on the level of confidence towards the police. We also tested to see whether there was a difference for people whose parent(s) were an immigrant and found no relationship.

in the level of organisation of CSOs: while the ratio of CSOs with formal internal governance structures was 74% in 2005, the figure now is 96.6%. Civil society capacity development efforts implemented during this period can be said to have had a visible impact.

2.2. Infrastructure


There is also a substantial improvement in the extent of cooperation and collective action among CSOs since the ratio of CSOs that belong to a platform rose from around 20% in 2005 to 38.6% in 2010. This could be attributed in part to the visible success of a number of such collective movements in mobilising the masses, as was the case with the *Bu Memleket Bizim* (This Country is Ours) Platform in 2004, and in changing policies, as the *Dumansız Ada* (Smoke-free Island) Platform did in 2008.¹⁶ The emphasis placed by some international donors, such as UNDP-ACT and the EU, on the development of CSO networks has also contributed to this development. The Gender Equality Platform, for instance, was created with technical assistance from the EU.

Nevertheless, the number of umbrella organisations, the presence of which can contribute to making civil society a more effective actor in shaping policies, still remains low. An important factor behind this is the law, which does not allow legal personalities to formally establish or be members of other legal entities.

2.3 Sectoral communication

As the figure below illustrates, a much larger percentage of CSOs communicate and exchange information with each other even though they are not members of any platform, network, or umbrella organisation.

Figure 3.6: Infrastructure and sectoral communication



2.4 Human resources

This sub-dimension represents the sustainability of human resources, measured as the percentage of organisations where voluntary staff constitute less than 25% of the staff base. The score of 8.3 indicates that only about 8% of the CSOs surveyed had that ratio of volunteers to professional staff. This suggests that although 35.6% of CSOs stated that they have paid staff, the majority of CSOs with some paid staff still depend to a large extent on their active volunteers. Most CSOs in the Turkish Cypriot Community, social CSOs and

¹⁶ Refer to <http://208.109.194.187/biyologlar/duyuru.aspx?ID=183> for more information about *Dumansız Ada* and to <http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/32541-kibrislilar-baris-ve-cozum-icin-sokakta> and <http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/32615-kibrista-referanduma-evet-mitingi> for more information on *Bu Memleket Bizim*.

advocacy CSOs in particular, are run by volunteer members of boards of directors and/or steering committees, which might explain this finding.

2.5 Financial and technological resources


Although the post-referendum period brought in an influx of international funds for CSOs, particularly from the EU, the analysis of the financial resources that they have access to shows that most CSOs can be self-sustaining with membership fees, service fees and private donations (see Table 25). About 35% of CSOs secure more than half of their revenues from membership fees, while 21% rely exclusively on membership fees. Only 8.8% of CSOs derive more than half of their financial resources from international donors and 3.3% rely exclusively on these funds. Overall, civil society in the TCC seems to have a diverse base of financial resources, which suggests a good chance of sustainability.

Table 25: Financial resources

Sources of funding	% of organisations with this source	% of organisations with 50% or more of its resources coming from this source	% of organisations with 100% of its resources coming from this source
Government funding	18.9	1.1	0
Corporate funding	11.1	3.3	1.1
Funding from donor organisations	21.1	8.8	3.3
Funding from private donations	45.6	17.6	4.4
Membership fees	63.3	35.4	21.1
Service fees	27.8	6.6	2.2

Compared to last year, revenues of 42.7% of CSOs surveyed had increased, revenues of 39.3% had decreased, and those of 18% had stayed the same.

Figure 3.7: Revenues compared to last year



Nevertheless, as the table below illustrates, many CSOs still lack regular access to primary technological resources.

Table 26: Technological resources

	% of CSOs		
	No	Yes, sporadically	Yes, regularly
Access to telephone	41.6	6.7	51.7
Access to fax	49.4	9	41.6
Access to computer	20.2	7.9	71.9
Access to internet	19.1	10.1	70.8

2.6 International linkages

This sub-dimension refers to the ratio of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) present in the country to the total number of known INGOs, as presented in the Union of International Associations database. The score given to this sub-dimension by the methodology is 10.6. However, this is in fact the correct figure only for the Greek Cypriot Community. The dataset that was consulted does not separate provide information for the Turkish Cypriot Community, and given that it is not recognised, the official presence of INGOs on this part of the island is highly problematic. Therefore, the score given here should be taken as an over-estimation.

Conclusion

Despite an impressive level of organisation in terms of the institutionalisation of CSOs' internal governing structures, and promising levels of financial sustainability and communication among CSOs working on similar issues, more remains to be done in terms of attaining a more sustainable human resource base (i.e. employing more professional staff) and developing more organised support networks in order to strengthen civil society in the Turkish Cypriot Community. Contacts with INGOs, and their presence on this part of the island in particular, are severely limited due to the political status quo on the island.

3. PRACTICE OF VALUES

Table 27: Practice of Values sub-dimension scores

3. Dimension: Practice of Values	50.9
3.1 Democratic decision-making governance	43.2
3.2 Labour regulations	38.4
3.3 Code of conduct and transparency	76.3
3.4 Environmental standards	45.5
3.5 Perception of values in civil society as a whole	51.1


This dimension measures the extent to which civil society internally practices values that make it a progressive driving force for democracy and peace. Civil society in the TCC receives a mediocre score on this dimension as well. Code of conduct and transparency received the highest scores among the five sub-dimensions, showing that the majority of CSOs have publicly available codes of conduct and offer public access to their financial information. This can again be attributed to the multitude of organisational capacity development programmes many CSOs have had the chance to benefit from in the past few years.

3.1 Democratic decision-making governance

This sub-dimension reflects the percentage of CSOs that practice internal democratic decision-making. When asked 'who takes decisions in your organisation?' the majority of

CSO representatives stated that appointed boards have decision-making power in their respective organisations; elected boards have that power in a quarter of CSOs.


Figure 3.8: Internal democracy



While appointed boards take key decisions in 56.2% of the CSOs surveyed, elected boards take key decisions in 24.7% and elected leaders in 4.5% of CSOs. Decision-making power lies in the hands of staff in 3.4% and of members in 10% of CSOs. Although the latter two figures can be interpreted as signs of limited hierarchy, and hence of more direct democracy, especially if decisions are taken by consensus, they also raise questions of accountability.

3.2 Labour regulations

This sub-dimension is a combination of four indicators that capture whether CSOs have written equal opportunity policies and publicly available policies on labour standards, whether their professional staff members are unionised and whether their new staff members receive training on labour rights. Overall, 12.5% of all paid staff members employed within civil society are unionised. Although the majority of CSOs have publicly available policies on labour standards, 40% provide training on labour rights to their new staff, and only 35.2% have written policies on equal opportunity or 'equal pay for equal work' for women.

Figure 3.9: Labour regulations practiced by CSOs

When analysing results of the Organisational Survey, we also categorised all CSOs into three separate categories - membership-based/professional, rights/advocacy and service-providing/social - and ran cross tabulations to explore whether these different types of CSOs reveal different characteristics, values, and attitudes. This categorisation proved to be statistically significant in only a couple of questions, one of which was whether organisations provided training on labour rights for their new staff. While the percentage of membership-based/professional organisations that provides such training is 79%, it is only 30% among rights/advocacy groups, and 35% among service-providing/social CSOs.

3.3. Code of conduct and transparency

This sub-dimension combines two indicators - the percentage of CSOs that have a publicly available code of conduct for their staff and the percentage of CSOs that make their financial information publicly available. On both indicators, civil society in the TCC scores higher than most other indicators under this dimension: 70.5% of CSOs state that they have publicly available codes of conduct for their staff, and 82.1% assert that their financial information is publicly available. The law mandates that CSOs, associations in particular, hold annual financial accounts and present to their general assemblies for approval. The AC, however, raised the question of whether this amounted to full transparency and accountability since external auditing is not a common practice in TCC civil society. The rigorous financial accountability required in the management of EU funds, however, must have contributed to raising the quality of financial reporting.

3.4 Environmental standards

Reflecting levels of responsibility and sensitivity towards environmental issues, this sub-dimension captures the percentage of CSOs with publicly available policies on environmental standards. 45.5% of CSOs in the TCC are found to have such environmental policies, showing that, just like gender, environmental awareness still needs to be mainstreamed into the routine of civil society. Only after civil society itself internalises and mainstreams these values will it be able to promote them in the society at large.

3.5 Perception of values in civil society as a whole

The perceptions of CSOs with regards to the practice of a number of desirable values within civil society in which they operate are highly negative. Figure 3.11 shows how civil society is doubtful about its role in promoting internal democracy and peace in the country. An overwhelming majority of civil society representatives surveyed were also highly pessimistic

about the prevalence of corruption within civil society (Figure 3.12). Given this level of cynicism and mistrust within civil society itself, low trust and apathy towards civil society among the public should not be surprising.

Figure 3.10: Perceived promotion of democracy and peace by civil society






Figure 3.11: Perceived corruption within civil society



56% of CSO representatives interviewed believe that corruption occurs very frequently, frequently, or occasionally in civil society; only 9% believe that it is a very rare occurrence, while about one third of all CSOs could not or chose not to respond to this question, which in itself can be interpreted as a sign of suspicion.


Civil society's assessment of the prevalence of racism, discrimination and intolerance within civil society is also alarming. When asked about the prevalence of explicitly racist, discriminating and intolerant forces within society, only 17.4% of CSO representatives indicated that there were none; the remaining asserted that there were some or even many examples.

Figure 3.12: Perceived presence of racist, discriminating and intolerant forces within civil society



Additionally, while 17.8% of CSO representatives stated that racist, discriminating, and intolerant forces are completely isolated from the rest of the civil society and 21.1% said that they are only marginal actors, 20% believe they are dominant actors and 18.9% believe they are significant actors.


Figure 3.13: Perceived strength of racist, discriminating and intolerant forces in civil society



Finally, a quarter of CSO representatives interviewed stated that violence is practiced by significant mass-based groups to express their interests, while 44% indicated that isolated civil society groups occasionally resort to violence. Another quarter of the respondents stated that the use of violence by civil society is extremely rare. Although this again points to a negative self-perception of civil society, since only 25% believe that use of violence by civil society is a rare phenomenon, it also shows that CSOs' awareness on violence is high, since we know the use of physical violence by CSOs to be extremely rare. In other words, CSOs are able to recognise other forms of violence (e.g. structural, verbal, psychological), which

suggests that these organisations have the potential to promote the rejection of violence in all its forms. The same argument can be made about the recognition of racist, discriminating, and intolerant forces within civil society as well.

Figure 3.14: Prevalence of violence in civil society



Conclusion

Although civil society in the TCC has been developing in some respects, particularly in terms of the institutionalisation and financial stability of CSOs, it still falls short in terms of becoming a driving force for democracy, social justice and peace. CSOs themselves are mistrustful of civil society in terms of corruption, and tendency to be racist, intolerant, and violent. Only 35.6% of CSOs believe civil society can play an important role in promoting non-violence and peace. Given the high level of awareness on the different forms of violence and the recognition that violence is practiced in these different forms by civil society itself, there is the potential that CSOs with this awareness can assume a leading role in spreading this awareness and rejection of violence to civil society and society at large.

4. PERCEPTION OF IMPACT

Table 28: Perception of Impact sub-dimension scores

4. Dimension: Perception of Impact	49.8
4.1 Responsiveness (internal perception)	57.1
4.2 Social impact (internal perception)	72.3
4.3 Policy impact (internal perception)	42.6
4.4 Responsiveness (external perception)	56.9
4.5 Social impact (external perception)	73.4
4.6 Policy impact (external perception)	30.4
4.7 Impact of civil society on attitudes	16.2


This dimension measures perceived impact, assessing both internal perceptions (i.e. by civil society representatives) and external perceptions (i.e. by other stakeholders) of civil society on issues of social concern, policy-making, and on the attitudes of society as a whole.

Overall, civil society and external stakeholders have similar perceptions of civil society's impact on most issues.

4.1 and 4.4. Responsiveness


Responsiveness refers to the effectiveness of civil society in responding to the priority concerns of society. The 2009 Eurobarometer Survey showed economic issues (i.e. the 'economic situation' and unemployment) to be the top priority concern of the TCC. Following the economy was the Cyprus conflict.

Figure 3.15: Internal perception of responsiveness




As the graph above illustrates, civil society's perceptions of its own responsiveness to the top two issues that are of top concern for the TCC are highly similar. When asked about the impact of civil society on these two issues, the most common response in both cases was 'very limited'. While 24.4% of CSOs believed that civil society had a high level of impact on the economy, 21.1% believed that it had a high level of impact on the Cyprus conflict.

If we compare internal perceptions with the perceptions of external stakeholders, we see that external stakeholders are more pessimistic about the impact of civil society particularly on the economy. While 7.8% of CSOs believe that civil society has no impact on economic issues, the same belief is shared by 16.7% of the external stakeholders we surveyed. While 24.4% of CSOs indicate that civil society has high impact on these issues, only 13.3% of external stakeholders make a similar statement.



Figure 3.16: Perceived impact on economic issues

The perceptions of the two groups on civil society's impact on the Cyprus conflict are much more similar to each other. Comparing perceptions on the impact of civil society on the economy with those on the Cyprus conflict, we see that external stakeholders are far more optimistic on civil society's impact on the Cyprus conflict than they are about civil society's impact on the economy. The percentage of external stakeholders who believe civil society has no impact on the economy (16.7%) is close to three times of that for the Cyprus conflict (6.7%). While the percentage of external stakeholders who express that civil society has high impact on economic issues is 13.3%, 20% the same group believe that civil society has high impact on the Cyprus conflict. These findings are in line with the role international funders have assigned to civil society as promoters of bi-communality and reconciliation.

Figure 3.17: Perceived impact on the Cyprus conflict



4.2 and 4.5 Social impact

CSOs included in the survey were asked in what fields they exert the most impact. Education was ranked the first, followed by social development and reconciliation of the two communities. They were then asked to assess civil society's impact on the top two fields, the results of which are presented in Figure 3.18.

Figure 3.18: Fields with perceived impact of own organisation**Figure 3.19: Internal perception of civil society's impact on selected fields**

Overall, we can see that an overwhelming majority of the CSOs interviewed find civil society in general to have tangible or high level of impact on the fields it selected above.


However, external stakeholders' views on the top fields on which civil society exerts impact differ from those of CSOs. Both the ordering and the perceived levels of impact are different. The top field selected by external stakeholders – employment – is not even in the top six for CSOs.

Figure 3.20: External perception of the top fields of civil society impact**Figure 3.21: External perception of the level of civil society impact on selected fields**

Comparing figures 3.19 and 3.21, we can clearly see that there is more consensus among external stakeholders on civil society's impact on selected fields than among CSOs. Close to 70% of external stakeholders state that civil society has 'some tangible impact' on the top fields that they think civil society exerts the most impact on. Responses by CSOs, on the other hand, are more diverse: 5.1%, 21.8%, 42.3%, and 30.8% of CSOs responded with 'no impact', 'very limited impact', 'some tangible impact', and 'high level of impact' respectively.

4.3 and 4.6 Policy impact


When it comes to civil society's impact on policy-making in general, perceptions of both CSOs and external stakeholders are more negative.

Figure 3.22: Perceived impact on policy-making

Comparing figures 3.19, 3.21 and 3.22, we see that civil society's impact on public policies is perceived by both civil society itself and external stakeholders to be a lot more limited than its impact in the social field. While the most common response given by both CSOs and external stakeholders on the impact of civil society on selected social fields is that it has 'some tangible impact', the most common response for both on civil society's impact on policy-making is that it is 'very limited'. 45.6% of CSOs and 63.3% of external stakeholders assess civil society's impact on policy-making to be 'very limited'; 6.7% of CSOs and 13.3% of external stakeholders believe that civil society has no influence on public policies.

4.7 Impact of civil society on attitudes

The impact of civil society on values and attitudes (public goods, moral values, tolerance and trust) is calculated by the difference between the responses of civil society members and non-members (on the basis of an assumption that being a member of a CSO improves those values and attitudes). The score of 16.2 is one of the lowest sub-dimension scores, which shows that active members of civil society are not generally more trusting, tolerant or socially responsible or sensitive than the rest of the society.

Figure 3.23: Difference between active CSO members and non-members

The figure above reflects the difference in mean levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness between active CSO members and non-members. While no difference is observed regarding levels of inter-personal trust, we see a big difference in the trust members and non-members place in civil society: Although they are not any more trustful of others in general, active CSO members are more trustful of civil society than inactive members or non-members. There are relatively smaller differences in levels of tolerance and public spiritedness.

Conclusion

Both internal and external perceptions on the impact of civil society on public policies drove down the score of TCC civil society on this dimension. Assessments of civil society's impact in the social field are more positive. Just like low levels of engagement in rights-based advocacy CSOs, this scepticism on civil society's impact on policy-making can, at least in part, be explained as a function of the recent history of such CSOs and of advocacy and lobbying efforts by civil society in the TCC.

The low score civil society received on the impact of being an active civil society member on inter-personal trust, tolerance, public spiritedness and trust in civil society suggests that active members of civil society are not in general more progressive than the rest of the society in regards to these desirable attitudes. As proposed also in our discussion on the Practice of Values dimension, values of non-violence, democracy, and justice, as well as attitudes of trust, tolerance, and public spiritedness, still need to be embraced and internalised by civil society before it can become a driving force for a more democratic and peaceful society.

5. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

Table 29: External Environment sub-dimension scores

5. Dimension: External Environment	70.4
5.1 Socio-economic context	81.6
5.2 Socio-political context	78.0
5.3 Socio-cultural context	51.5

This dimension characterises the environment within which civil society exists and operates to capture how conducive it is for the development of civil society. Three elements of the environment are explored - socio-economic context (the level of human development primarily), socio-political context (political rights and civil liberties), and socio-cultural context (level of interpersonal trust, public spiritedness, and tolerance). While the external environment scores relatively well on the first two of these sub-dimensions, the low score of the socio-cultural context drives the overall score down.


Overall, the External Environment, with a dimension score of 70.4, is suitable for the further development of civil society. The main obstacle appears to be the prevalence of intolerance and lack of trust in society, which, as discussed above, is a problem within civil society as well.

5.1 Socio-economic context


This sub-dimension is calculated by using four indicators which use data from external sources: the Social Watch Basic Capabilities Index (BCI), the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, the Gini coefficient computed by the World Bank to measure inequality, and the ratio of external debt to GNI based on World Bank Development Indicators to indicate economic context. It is important to note that the figures used in calculating this sub-dimension for the TCC are in fact the figures that correspond to the GCC alone since the international external sources used do not provide separate data for the Turkish Cypriot Community. Given the generally lower levels of human and economic development in the TCC compared to the GCC, we can assume that the score for this sub-dimension is over-estimated for the TCC.

5.2 Socio-political context

Five indicators comprise this sub-dimension: political rights and freedoms, rule of law and personal freedoms, associational and organisational rights, experience by CSOs of the legal framework, and state effectiveness. The first three of these indicators reflect Freedom House Index scores on Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Freedom House publishes separate scores for the TCC and the GCC.

Figure 3.24: Socio-political context, Freedom House scores

In the Organisational Survey, we also asked CSOs for their assessment of the country's laws and regulations on civil society.

Figure 3.25: CSOs' assessment of laws and regulations on civil society

With 58.3%, 'moderately enabling' was the most common response given by CSO representatives included in the survey. 12.5% and 25% stated that laws and regulations were 'quite limiting' and 'highly restrictive' respectively for civil society. Only 4.2% felt that the legal environment was 'fully enabling'.

The score for state effectiveness, which measures the extent to which a state can fulfil its functions, is also drawn from an external source – the World Bank Governance Dataset – which has no separate data for the Turkish Cypriot Community. The score used here, therefore, is also likely to be an over-estimation.


5.3 Socio-cultural context

The socio-cultural context is analysed on levels of inter-personal trust, tolerance towards different groups (minorities in particular) and levels of public spiritedness. The expectation is

that the higher the levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness within a society, the more nurturing the context will be for civil society.


In the Population Survey, people were asked whether they believe ‘most people can be trusted’. As the graph below illustrates, 91.8% of people say that they ‘need to be very careful’ in trusting people.¹⁷ This general lack of trust can have major repercussions, such as low levels of trust and confidence in different organisations, which we discuss below. It might also partially explain high levels of intolerance, which might be reflecting mistrust and fear of diversity. Low levels of inter-personal trust can also explain the hesitation of the public to get engaged in civil society, which would require working together with other people for common interests.

Figure 3.26: Inter-personal trust



Analysing people’s levels of confidence in various state and non-state organisations, we see low levels of confidence in civilian political institutions, and in party politics in particular. As the table below illustrates, the TCC places the most trust in the armed forces and police, followed by the judiciary. People’s confidence in at least some CSOs is higher than that in the government, parliament and political parties. This might be a promising factor for the further development of civil society as a key political actor.

¹⁷ We tested for the effect of gender on this response and found no statistically relevant relationship.


Figure 3.27: Confidence in public organisations

When expressing values on public goods, the population in the TCC shows significant awareness and sensitivity, dismissing various free-riding examples as unjustifiable. This is a positive societal attribute, which can be interpreted as a reflection of social capital and as a rejection of the tendency to free-ride.

Table 30: Values on public goods

Values on public goods	% of respondents	
	Never justifiable	Always justifiable
Claiming government benefits you're not entitled to	88.3	3.7
Avoiding fare on public transportation	90.8	3.2
Cheating on taxes	97.5	0.5
Accepting bribes	98.5	0.2

In order to capture the level of tolerance and discrimination towards different marginalised groups, another question asked the respondents who they would not want as neighbours; the results are shown in figure 3.28. Intolerance against homosexuals reflects the continued prevalence of conservative, traditional, patriarchal norms in this society. Explicit intolerance towards people of a different race, religion or language, immigrants or foreign workers (who in the case of the TCC are mostly from Turkey), immigrants or workers from Turkey, and people wearing a turban or veil (who happen to be almost exclusively immigrants from Turkey) all confirm the growing racism in the TCC particularly towards people coming from Turkey (as workers, 'settlers', etc.). The continuing intolerance towards Greek Cypriots is also striking: more than half of the population would not want to be neighbours with Greek Cypriots.

Figure 3.28: Levels of intolerance

We also tested the effect of ethnic identity (self-professed) on levels of tolerance and found statistically significant relationships with attitudes towards people of a different race, immigrants from Turkey, and people wearing veils (see table 31 below). How one identifies himself/herself ethnically in the TCC has traditionally been a highly political issue, reflecting not only ethnic background but also one's political stance on the Cyprus conflict and the future of the island. For instance, self-identifying as a 'Cypriot', as opposed to a 'Turkish Cypriot', can be interpreted to suggest a preference for a reunified Cyprus and opposition against Turkey's control of domestic politics. This analysis shows that people who identify as 'Cypriots' are most likely to discriminate against people of a different race. Those who emphasise Cyprus in their ethnic identity - those who identify as 'Turkish Cypriot', 'Cypriot', or 'Cypriot first, then a Turk' - are more likely than other groups, who represent more the immigrant community, to discriminate against immigrants or workers from Turkey and people wearing veils or turbans, who are almost exclusively immigrants from Turkey as well.

Table 31: Ethnicity and intolerance

Ethnic identity	Would not want as neighbour (% of respondents)		
	People of a different race	Immigrants/workers from Turkey	People wearing veil/turban
Cypriot	47	30	29
Cypriot first, then a Turk	15	39	31
Turkish Cypriot	29	32	34
Turk first, then a Cypriot	29	14	12
Turk living in Cyprus	35	7	7
Turk	22	22	22

Conclusion

Although it would be misleading to draw any conclusions regarding the socio-economic context, since the indicator scores used here might not reflect the true context in the TCC ,

we can generally say that socio-political context is suitable for a more active and effective civil society, while the socio-cultural context requires investment by civil society itself to make society more trusting and tolerant. It is a promising step for civil society, particularly with regards to its apparent weakness in intervening in and impacting on policy-making, that it is now paying special attention to laws and regulations that might make the context more restrictive for its functioning. The Cyprus NGO Network, composed of 15 CSOs in the TCC, taking on the issue of the new draft Law on Associations and conducting an advocacy and lobbying campaign against this draft and for a lot more liberal and democratic law, which it has drafted, is a good illustration of this.¹⁸

¹⁸ For more information on this see:
<http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/popup.php/cat/5/news/92724/PageName/Ekonomi>.

IX. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CYPRUS – TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

The strengths and weaknesses, as well as the recommendations that follow, were identified during an AC meeting where the TCC CSI results were presented and discussed.

STRENGTHS:

1. Depth of social and political engagement: Although a small group of people is actively involved in civil society, the involvement of this group is deep and extensive. Furthermore, this involvement cuts across different fields, which lends itself to unique opportunities for cooperation and synergy between CSOs working on different issues (e.g. NGO Network, Dumansız Ada Platform, Engel Siz İnsiyatifi).
2. Internal governance: Capacity development programmes implemented during the past five years have contributed to the institutionalisation of formal governance and management structures by almost all CSOs.
3. Prospects for financial sustainability: Funding from external donors constitute more than 50% of the financial resources of only a very a small group of CSOs (9%), whereas 35% of CSOs derive a majority of their resources from membership fees, 18% from private donations, 7% from service fees, 3% from corporate funding, and 1% from the government. This shows that the financial resource base of civil society in the TCC is diverse and an overwhelming majority of CSOs will survive the potential withdrawal of external donor organisations from the island.
4. Financial transparency: More than 80% of the CSOs interviewed asserted that their financial information is publicly available. This is a good sign of accountability. Capacity building programmes, financial information required for submission of proposals and financial reports required for projects by external donors, and the growing access to technological resources have all contributed to this positive development.

WEAKNESSES:

1. The extent of social and political engagement remains low.
2. Practice of desirable values (e.g. democracy, non-violence, tolerance) by civil society is still limited. In other words, CSOs have developed substantially in terms of their structures, but they still have not internalised these values. Civil society's self-perception of its role in promoting these values within society at large is highly negative and pessimistic.
3. Civil society's self-perception on the prevalence of corruption within civil society is extremely negative, with only 9% of the respondents indicating that it is a 'rare' occurrence. This is a very surprising result, especially considering that a majority of CSOs interviewed said that their financial information is publicly available. The fact that internal and external auditing is still not widely practiced could explain this to some extent.
4. Limited policy impact: Traditionally civil society within the Turkish Cypriot community has been involved more in providing social services than with advocacy and lobbying for changes in policies. One exception to that have been membership-based groups, such as unions and professional organisations, involved in influencing policies for the particular benefit of its members. In other words, advocacy for human rights and lobbying for relevant laws and regulations that pertain to the society at large have not been taken on by civil society until recently.
5. The level of networking among CSOs has been limited. Although this could partly be due to legal constraints that stand in the way of CSOs establishing formal umbrella

organisations, lack of trust within civil society and civil society's negative self-perception must also be factors.

X. RECOMMENDATIONS – TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

- There is a need for personal development trainings and peace education that focuses on intra-personal peace to promote self-esteem and self-confidence. The lack of this, in the view of the Advisory Committee, is contributing to low levels of inter-personal and inter-organisational trust. Further, in the 2005 CSI report it was recommended that the teaching of Greek and Turkish as a second language should be introduced to build upon personal development and capacity building. In this report, while there has been no specific mention of the issues of language, personal development trainings have been indicated as a recommendation, in which language education could form a part. As such the recommendations made from the 2005 report are still applicable in the present, despite the progress made within civil society.
- Promotion of more networking and formation of platforms is needed. This will contribute to a stronger and more effective civil society as organisations with different strengths, expertise and spheres of influence pull their forces together. Such networks will also provide opportunities for improving levels of inter-personal and inter-organisational trust as individuals and organisations work together.
- There is need to lobby for a change in how the state understands civil society, from seeing it as a tool to influence constituencies around the times of elections to seeing it as a partner in developing a more peaceful and just society, and as a watchdog of people's rights. This change in attitude should particularly involve the institutionalisation of systematic financial support to CSOs, especially rights-based advocacy groups and social service organisations which cannot depend on membership fees.
- CSOs need to develop communication strategies for networking with other CSOs, for contact with state authorities, and for outreach to the wider public. This should be one component of CSOs' periodic strategic plans. In the previous report, a recommendation was put forth that CSOs utilise 'media more effectively to promote programmes and disseminate information'. This level of communication via the wider media would be a means of extending outreach to the public and promoting the messages of the CSOs.
- More emphasis needs to be put on cooperation and partnership between civil society and public agencies. The 2005 report also highlighted the need for more emphasis to be placed on increasing the links between civil society and public agencies, and while there has been some improvement there is still a need for progress to be made.
- More emphasis needs to be put on policy-level engagements (i.e. lobbying and advocacy as opposed to provision of services alone).
- Overall, given the levels of intolerance and discrimination both among the public at large and within civil society, CSOs must be encouraged to urgently adopt a human rights-based approach and formulate effective strategies to spread a corresponding attitude change among the public and state authorities.

XI. CONCLUSIONS – TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

CSI is an action-oriented project that aims to generate information and knowledge that can be used to foster the development of a vibrant civil society that embraces and promotes accountability and transparency, democracy, inclusiveness, non-violence and peace, participation and tolerance. As a result, while maintaining cross-country compatibility, it also allows for context specificity to capture the reality of civil society and its environment in each country. Implementation is also a participatory process: during the implementation phase, an Advisory Committee, composed of local civil society, state, media and academia representatives, was consulted periodically. The CSI study was undertaken in the TCC to generate much-needed scientific knowledge about civil society and its strengths and weaknesses, which would then serve as the basis for developing a strong, ideal civil society. The CSI's flexibility in terms of being able to incorporate context-specific components into the study allowed the two teams working on developing two separate sets of data and analyses for the TCC and the GCC to work jointly and explore civil society's role in the reconciliation process as well. It is hoped that the results of this work will contribute to empowering civil society on both sides of the island to be more effective in both garnering mass support for bi-communal activities and reconciliation, and pressuring public officials at the negotiation table.

Having come a long way in terms of institutionalisation of internal governance structures, securing a diverse base of financial resources and taking steps towards transparency, civil society in the TCC now needs to invest in internalising and spreading values of tolerance, inclusion, participation, democracy and peace. While continuing their involvement in bi-communal activities and promotion of reconciliation at both the grassroots and the elite levels, CSOs need to recognise discrimination and intolerance in all its forms, which seem to be widespread not only in the public at large but also within civil society itself, and take steps to promote their alternatives. Civil society's impact seems to be limited particularly on policy-making. Capacity building in advocacy and lobbying, establishing effective communication channels with public officials and decision-makers, and cooperation of CSOs as networks and platforms will enhance civil society's political impact. A visible increase in impact might also encourage more people to get engaged in civil society. Despite low levels of both social and political engagement at this point, the fact that CSOs are among social forces most trusted by the public – coming after the military and the police but before political parties, the parliament and the government – suggests that the TCC is open to a more active and vocal civil society.

The history of civil society as an independent political actor in the TCC is fairly new. Without an institutionalised state structure, particularly between 1964 and 1975, the line between civil society and the state in the TCC had been blurred. While sports and cultural organisations, and unions and professional organisations existed even before the establishment of independent Republic of Cyprus, rights-based advocacy organisations articulating broader public interests and human rights have developed mostly in the past decade or so. Support provided by the EU to these CSOs in the TCC following the rejection of the Annan Plan for re-unification by the GCC has contributed to a more vibrant and empowered civil society in this respect. Given the political status quo, civil society remains the key point of contact between the TCC and the international community. Civil society can use this status to its advantage and strengthen its position as a legitimate political actor, not just in the international arena but also within the country and in relations with the GCC.


XII. COMPARING CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

1. COMPARISON OF CIVIL SOCIETIES AND EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTS

The overall statuses of civil society in the GCC and TCC are highly similar. The comparison of dimension and sub-dimension scores for the two communities (see table 32 below) illustrates this point. The largest difference, with 9 points out of 100, is seen on the dimension that measures the level of organisation. A large difference in the availability of support structures for civil society is responsible for the divergence in this dimension score. Although civil society in the two communities receives similar scores for the practice of values, it is interesting to note that scores for the corresponding sub-dimensions are very different: while civil society in the GCC receives an impressive score in terms of internal democracy, it scores much lower when it comes to labour regulations, publicly available codes of conduct and financial information, environmental standards, and its self-perception of the practice of desirable values in civil society as a whole. Civil society in the TCC scores higher in all these sub-dimensions except for internal democracy.

There are also differences in the profiles of the two communities in terms of tendencies to get involved in civil society. While a larger percentage of people in the GCC are active members of both social and political organisations compared to the TCC, a larger percentage of people are active members of more than one social or political organisation in the latter. This is reflected as higher extent of engagement scores for the GCC but higher depth of engagement scores for the TCC.

Figure 4.1: Comparing Civic Engagement scores



People in the two communities tend to favour similar types of CSOs: sports associations and cultural groups are the most popular social organisations, while trade unions and professional organisations are among the top popular political organisations in both communities.

The perception of impact dimension scores are similar for the two communities, with the TCC scoring slightly higher on some sub-dimensions, and the GCC scoring slightly higher on others. One noticeable difference is that external stakeholders' perception of civil society's

policy impact in the GCC is significantly higher than that in the TCC. This seems to be a realistic difference since civil society in the Turkish Cypriot Community has so far been involved more in providing social services than with advocacy and lobbying for changes in policies, although this has recently started to change. When it comes to civil society's impact on the Cyprus conflict, both civil society itself and external stakeholders in the GCC seem to be more pessimistic than their counterparts in the TCC.

Figure 4.2: Comparing internal perceptions on civil society's impact on the Cyprus conflict





Figure 4.3: Comparing external perceptions on civil society's impact on the Cyprus conflict




Comparison of scores for the external environment suggests the presence of a slightly more favourable environment for civil society to operate and develop in the Greek Cypriot Community. It scores about 7 points higher on the socio-cultural context and 13 points higher on the socio-political score. Comparison of scores for the socio-economic context would be misleading: because external macro-economic data is not available for the Turkish Cypriot Community separately, values that are applicable only for the Greek Cypriot Community were also used in computing the socio-economic context score for the TCC. As a result, the overall environment score derived for the Turkish Cypriot Community is likely to be an over-estimation, suggesting an environment that is shown to be more suitable than it actually is.

Table 32: Overall comparison of scores


Dimension/sub-dimension	GCC	TCC
1. Dimension: Civic Engagement	43.6	43.6
1.1 Extent of socially-based engagement	24.1	21.0
1.2 Depth of socially-based engagement	30.4	70.4
1.3 Diversity of socially-based engagement	77.2	34.3
1.4 Extent of political engagement	23.5	21.1
1.5 Depth of political engagement	23.8	62.5
1.6 Diversity of political engagement	82.5	51.9
2. Dimension: Level of Organisation	59.8	50.5
2.1 Internal governance	98.9	96.6
2.2 Support Infrastructure	80.7	37.9
2.3 Sectoral communication	77.4	74.3
2.4 Human resources	16.5	8.3
2.5 Financial and technological resources	74.8	75.6
2.6 International linkages	10.6	10.6
3. Dimension: Practice of Values	46.1	50.9
3.1 Democratic decision-making governance	92.9	43.2
3.2 Labour regulations	27.7	38.4
3.3 Code of conduct and transparency	44.1	76.3
3.4 Environmental standards	22.2	45.5
3.5 Perception of values in civil society as a whole	43.1	51.1
4. Dimension: Perception of Impact	53.3	49.8
4.1 Responsiveness (internal perception)	51.6	57.1
4.2 Social impact (internal perception)	78.0	72.3
4.3 Policy impact (internal perception)	48.6	42.6
4.4 Responsiveness (external perception)	45.7	56.9
4.5 Social impact (external perception)	76.8	73.4
4.6 Policy impact (external perception)	52.2	30.4
4.7 Impact of civil society on attitudes	20.2	16.2
5. Dimension: External Environment	77.1	70.4
5.1 Socio-economic context	81.6	81.6
5.2 Socio-political context	91.0	78.0
5.3 Socio-cultural context	58.7	51.5

2. COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS BI-COMMUNAL ACTIVITIES AND RECONCILIATION

While 31.2% of the population in the GCC would not want ‘Turkish Cypriots’ as neighbours, 51% of the population in the TCC would not want ‘Greek Cypriots’ as neighbours. Levels of intolerance are in general higher in the TCC, with a larger portion of the population stating that they would not want different groups as neighbours.


Figure 4.4: Comparing levels of tolerance

2004 was a turning point in relations between the TCC and the GCC; it was the first time reconciliation seemed close. However, the referendum for the Annan Plan for a re-unified Cyprus ended in failure, with 64.9% of the TCC and only 24.2% of the GCC voting yes. This resulted in disappointment, particularly on the part the TCC majority that had voted for the plan, which then led to less enthusiasm in getting involved in bi-communal activities. The opposite happened in the Greek Cypriot Community, with more people in the GCC participating in such activities in the aftermath of the referendum. Nevertheless, the percentage of population participating in bi-communal events has been larger in the TCC both before and after 2004.


Figure 4.5: Comparing people's participation in bi-communal activities

The most common type of bi-communal activity people participated in was cultural activities for both communities, followed by political and environment-related events.

The proportion of the population regularly visiting the other side of the island is also larger in the TCC. The top two reasons for the TCC to visit the GCC are leisure and shopping. A large portion of the population in the GCC, on the other hand, has visited the TCC only a few times, with the top reasons being 'visiting birth places' and 'pilgrimage' to sacred sites. A larger portion of the GCC, compared with the TCC, has never been to the other side.

Figure 4.6: Comparing visits to the 'other side'

Compared with the general population, the attitude of CSOs in the TCC to participation in bi-communal activities after 2004 has been more positive. This can be explained by the influx of external funding opportunities which came in most cases with conditions of bi-communality (e.g. UNDP-ACT/USAID funds). Similarly, participation of GCC CSOs in bi-communal activities more than doubled.

Figure 4.7: Comparing CSO participation in bi-communal activities

Similar to perceptions on the impact of civil society in general on the Cyprus conflict, perceptions on the impact of bi-communal activities on reconciliation are more positive

among both the public and external stakeholders in the TCC. Perceptions of CSOs in the GCC, however, are more optimistic in this regard than their counterparts in the TCC.

Figure 4.8: Population's perceptions of the value of bi-communal activities to reconciliation




Figure 4.9: Civil society's perceptions of the value of bi-communal activities to reconciliation





Figure 4.10: External stakeholders' perceptions of the value of bi-communal activities to reconciliation




3. CONCLUSION AND ISLAND-WIDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY THAT CAN CONTRIBUTE TO RECONCILIATION

With all three surveys that were conducted to construct the CSI, we asked additional questions to gauge the role of civil society on the Cyprus conflict and on reconciliation.

The following points emerged with respect to the Greek Cypriot Community:

A major focus of the surveys was to determine whether reconciliation activities make a positive contribution to the reconciliation process. The findings show that overall these activities do make a positive contribution but there is a need to engage more people in bi-communal activities, thereby reaching out to people who may not have an understanding of the potential benefits of working across the border. Further, it was established that half the sample population does not visit the Turkish Cypriot community at all, and therefore would have no opportunity for interaction in a meaningful way. This further suggests the need for bi-communal activities to take place with greater engagement from the general public.

Figure 4.11: People in GCC who believe that bi-communal activities that promote understanding and reunification make a positive contribution to the reconciliation process




The Population Survey shows that 45% of people in GCC responded positively that bi-communal activities that promote understanding and reunification make a positive contribution to the reconciliation process; 30% responded negatively and 25% did not know whether they contribute positively or not.

When the same question was asked of respondents of the organisational questionnaire, 65% of organisations agreed that bi-communal activities made a positive contribution to the reconciliation process, 28% disagreed and 7% of the sample could not say what the impact is.

Finally, respondents in the external perceptions survey stated that 48% believe that these activities make a positive contribution, whilst 46% believe otherwise.

The most common bi-communal activities which people participated in were found to be cultural activities, followed by political and educational activities. Sports and environmental activities were the least common

Figure 4.12: Frequency of visits by GCC people to the TCC



Half of the GCC sample population stated that they do not visit the Turkish Cypriot Community at all. 26% of the respondents reported that they have visited the Turkish Cypriot community 1 to 4 times since 2004 and 13% once a year. Only 0.3% said that they visit it every week.


The most common reason for visiting the Turkish Cypriot community was to see a place of birth, followed by pilgrimage at 12% of the sample and visiting friends or relatives with 8%. The least common reasons are business, health, education and employment.

The following points emerged with respect to the Turkish Cypriot Community:

- The majority of the population is either completely negative or ambivalent about the contribution of bi-communal activities (organised by civil society) to the reconciliation process.
- After 2004, participation in bi-communal activities has slightly dropped. While 16% of the respondents of the Population Survey said they had participated in bi-communal activities prior to 2004, 14.7% said they participated after 2004. This suggests that the negative effect of the 2004 referendum on Turkish Cypriots surpassed the potential advantages of the opening of borders in 2003 and the abundance of external funding for bi-communal activities ever since.
- More than 4/10 of the population has never visited the GCC. Only about 18% visits regularly (at least a couple of times a month).
- While leisure and shopping constitute the most common reasons, only 12% identified civil society activities as reasons for visiting the GCC.

The attitudes of civil society and external stakeholders on bi-communal activities and the reconciliation process deviate significantly from that of society at large. While the public's participation in bi-communal activities dropped, the involvement of CSOs in such activities increased substantially. The percentage of CSOs that have participated in bi-communal activities increased from 40% to 70% after 2004. CSOs are being encouraged by external donors to organise and participate in such events. However, the enthusiasm of civil society in this regard does not seem to be matched by the general public. Furthermore, as figure 4.13 clearly illustrates, while civil society and other stakeholders strongly believe in the positive contribution of bi-communal activities on the peace process, the public is much more sceptical, which explains, at least in part, people's lack of interest in participating.

Figure 4.13: Contribution of bi-communal activities to the peace process



Conclusions

It is not surprising from this analysis that civil society in the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island have similar characteristics with minor differences. With the exception of sports clubs, the engagement of the general public in civil society activities is most common through membership-based organisations, such as unions and professional organisations. Advocacy groups promoting broad public interests, such as environment, health, gender, peace and education, are relatively weaker since organisations active in these fields are generally new. It is with the increasing presence of EU that both communities have been providing more space and resources for these organisations to become better organised and play a more active role to influence public policies.

UNDP-ACT has been a major supporter of initiatives which encourage acting across the divide and promote peace and reconciliation. General high-level political developments were a major blow to these initiatives, especially after the rejection of the UN brokered Annan plan by the majority of Greek Cypriots. The public at large has been disillusioned and lost motivation. However, those who were still inspired to work on reconciliation between the two communities found a firm support first from UNDP-ACT and later from the EU. This was reflected in the findings as growing interest by CSOs on both sides of the island in involvement in bi-communal activities and peace efforts, even with the decline in levels of participation by the public at large.

Recommendations:

1. There is scope to work with CSOs that are working in advocacy for public benefit in order to empower them to engage the public in their efforts and increase their lobbying and advocacy activities.
2. There is also a need to work on how better channels of communication can be established with decision makers.
3. Local authorities in both communities are very valuable partners to empower CSOs in all aspects. This role should be promoted in a more systematic manner.
4. International links of Cypriot NGOs are generally weak. The opportunities provided by various EU institutions and organisations should be utilised in a more strategic manner to strengthen these links, with the purpose of enhancing advocacy and lobbying to safeguard the interest of civil society in Cyprus.
5. CSOs can set examples in bi-communal cooperation on the island as well as in representations outside. This will be a stimulating development for reconciliation at all levels. For this to happen, structures of cooperation and representation become significant.
6. There is the need for more structured, long-term support to those CSOs which are working in advocacy for public benefit. Voluntary organisations can engage in ad-hoc events, but very much like unions and professional organisations, public benefit organisations also need professional support and professional structures in order to be more effective.

APPENDIX I. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH METHODS

The research activities included a total of three surveys that were conducted in both communities, namely a population survey, an organisational survey and an external perceptions survey. The surveys were undertaken by three sets of questionnaires and were carried out via face to face interviews and telephone interviews. All interviews, questionnaires and meetings were undertaken in the period March 2010 to February 2011.

Furthermore, in depth interviews were conducted with leaders of from the civil society sector, researchers and members of the 2005 CSI study team in relation to the changes in civil society between 2005 and 2010 and the impact of the 2005 CSI report. The report used the questionnaires given in the CSI Toolkit, but in order to take into consideration the existence of the two communities in Cyprus (Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot), some additional questions were used.

A stratified sample of organisations was used, where type of activity and location were the main part of the criteria (based on the NGO Directory of Cyprus), and a convenience sample of external stakeholders. Currently, there are more than 350 CSOs listed in the Cypriot Community. Nevertheless, research has indicated that there are a large number of inactive registered organisations, which makes the directory unreliable.

Below, a list of the organisations used in the surveys is shown, indicating the percentage of each type of organisation to the total sample.

Organisational Survey	GCC		TCC	
	N	%	N	%
Farmer / fisherman group or cooperative	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Traders' or business association	1	1.1%	3	3.4%
Professional association (e.g. doctors, teachers)	12	13.6%	8	9.1%
Trade union or labour union	3	3.4%	4	4.5%
Neighbourhood / village committee	0	0.0%	5	5.7%
Religious or spiritual group	2	2.3%	10	11.4%
Political group, movement or party	1	1.1%	0	0.0%
Cultural group or association (e.g. arts, music, theatre, film)	10	11.4%	0	0.0%
Co-operative, credit or savings group	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Education group (e.g. parent-teacher association)	4	4.5%	4	4.5%
Health group / social service association	15	17.0%	16	18.2%
Sports association	16	18.2%	7	8.0%
Youth group, children's organisation	3	3.4%	3	3.4%
Women's group	1	1.1%	8	9.1%
NGO / civic group / human rights organisation	9	10.2%	1	1.1%
Environmental or conservation organisation	1	1.1%	14	15.9%
Hobby organisation (e.g. stamp collecting club)	3	3.4%	1	1.1%
Human rights organisation	2	2.3%	3	3.4%
Other groups	5	5.7%	1	1.1%
Total	88	100.0%	88	100.0%

External Perceptions Survey	GCC		TCC	
	N	%	N	%
Executive branch of government	5	14.3%	4	13.3%
Parliament	0	0.0%	2	6.7%
Judiciary branch	3	8.6%	1	3.3%
Private sector	12	34.3%	10	33.3%
Media	7	20.0%	5	16.7%
Academia	3	8.6%	3	10.0%
International governmental organisation	0	0.0%	2	6.7%
Donor organisation	1	2.9%	2	6.7%
Local authorities	3	8.6%	1	3.3%
Total	35	100.0%	30	100.0%

APPENDIX II. IMPLEMENTATION TEAM AND ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS - GCC

Nana Achilleos: NGO-SC, Hands Across the Divide - www.handsacrossthedivide.org

Joseph Bayada: Symfiliosis

Xenia Constantinou: European Youth Forum and Cyprus Youth Council - www.cyc.org.cy

Katy Economidou: Hands Across the Divide - www.handsacrossthedivide.org

Stavroulla Georgiadou: UNDP-ACT Cyprus - www.undp-act.org

Doros Michael: Action for Equality Support and Antiracism in Cyprus - www.kisa.org.cy

Yiannis Papadakis: University of Cyprus - www.ucy.ac.cy

Andreas Pavlikas: Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) - www.peo.org.cy

Charis Psaltis: University of Cyprus and Association of Historical Research and Dialogue - www.ahdr.info

Panayiota Xenophontos: Girl Guides Association of Cyprus - www.europe.wagggsworld.org

APPENDIX III. IMPLEMENTATION TEAM AND ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS - TCC

CSI Project Coordinator: İzlem Sönmez
CSI Civil Society Expert: Dr. Ömür Yılmaz
Researcher: Muharrem Amcazade

Advisory Committee:

Aysel Bodi
 President, Akova Women's Association

Bekir Azgın
 Academician, Eastern Mediterranean University

Mustafa Abitoğlu
 Coordinator, Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Foundation

Nilgün Arif
 Programme Associate and Focal Point for People with Disabilities, UNDP-ACT

Emete İmge
 President, Universal Patient Rights Association

Işıl Yılmaz
 Member of KAYAD Community Centre Association of Women to Supporting Living

Mustafa Okan
 Employee of CSO Department of Presidency

Mehveş Beyidoğlu
 President of POST Research Institute

Bülent Kanol
 Executive Director of the Management Centre

Beran Djemal
 Turkish Cypriot Outreach Officer of Cyprus Community Media Centre

APPENDIX IV. CSI INDICATOR MATRIX - GCC

<i>Sub-dimension</i>	<i>Ind.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Score</i>
1) Dimension: Civic Engagement			43.6
1.1		Extent of socially-based engagement	24.1
	1.1.1	Social membership 1	14.0
	1.1.2	Social volunteering 1	12.5
	1.1.3	Community engagement 1	45.7
1.2		Depth of socially-based engagement	30.4
	1.2.1	Social membership 2	9.8
	1.2.2	Social volunteering 2	12.2
	1.2.3	Community engagement 2	69.1
1.3		Diversity of socially-based engagement	77.2
	1.3.1	Diversity of socially-based engagement	77.2
1.4		Extent of political engagement	23.5
	1.4.1	Political membership 1	14.0
	1.4.2	Political volunteering 1	11.9
	1.4.3	Individual activism 1	44.7
1.5		Depth of political engagement	23.8
	1.5.1	Political membership 2	16.3
	1.5.2	Political volunteering 2	20.5
	1.5.3	Individual activism 2	34.7
1.6		Diversity of political engagement	82.5
	1.6.1	Diversity of political engagement	82.5
2) Dimension: Level of Organisation			59.8
2.1		Internal governance	98.9
	2.1.1	Management	98.9
2.2		Infrastructure	80.7
	2.2.1	Support organisations	80.7
2.3		Sectoral communication	77.4
	2.3.1	Peer-to-peer communication 1	72.4
	2.3.2	Peer-to-peer communication 2	82.4
2.4		Human resources	16.5
	2.4.1	Sustainability of human resources	16.5
2.5		Financial and technological resources	74.8
	2.5.1	Financial sustainability	59.7
	2.5.2	Technological resources	89.8
2.6		International linkages	10.6
	2.6.1	International linkages	10.6
3) Dimension: Practice of Values			46.1
3.1		Democratic decision-making governance	92.9
	3.1.1	Decision-making	92.9
3.2		Labour regulations	28.4
	3.2.1	Equal opportunities	21.4
	3.2.2	Members of labour unions	31.8
	3.2.3	Labour rights training	27.8
	3.2.4	Publicly available policy for labour standards	32.7
3.3		Code of conduct and transparency	44.1
	3.3.1	Publicly available code of conduct	28.3
	3.3.2	Transparency	59.8
3.4		Environmental standards	22.2

	3.4.1	Environmental standards	22.2
3.5		Perception of values in civil society as a whole	43.1
	3.5.1	Perceived non-violence	10.5
	3.5.2	Perceived internal democracy	67.5
	3.5.3	Perceived levels of corruption	9.7
	3.5.4	Perceived intolerance	42.4
	3.5.5	Perceived weight of intolerant groups	66.1
	3.5.6	Perceived promotion on non-violence and peace	62.4
4) Dimension: Perception of Impact			53.3
4.1		Responsiveness (internal perception)	51.6
	4.1.1	Impact on social concern 1	51.9
	4.1.2	Impact on social concern 2	51.3
4.2		Social impact (internal perception)	78.0
	4.2.1	General social impact	76.3
	4.2.2	Social impact of own organisation	79.6
4.3		Policy impact (internal perception)	48.6
	4.3.1	General policy impact	51.8
	4.3.2	Policy activity of own organisation	38.8
	4.3.3	Policy impact of own organisation	55.2
4.4		Responsiveness (external perception)	45.7
	4.4.1	Impact on social concern 1	42.9
	4.4.2	Impact on social concern 2	48.5
4.5		Social impact (external perception)	76.8
	4.5.1	Social impact selected concerns	86.1
	4.5.2	Social impact general	67.6
4.6		Policy impact (external perception)	52.2
	4.6.1	Policy impact specific fields 1-3	64.3
	4.6.2	Policy impact general	40.0
4.7		Impact of civil society on attitudes	20.2
	4.7.1	Difference in trust between civil society members and non-members	14.3
	4.7.2	Difference in tolerance levels between civil society members and non-members	11.4
	4.7.3	Difference in public spiritedness between civil society members and non-members	0.0
	4.7.4	Trust in civil society	55.0
5) Dimension: External Environment			77.1
5.1		Socio-economic context	81.6
	5.1.1	Basic Capabilities Index	99.2
	5.1.2	Corruption	64.0
5.2		Socio-political context	91.0
	5.2.1	Political rights and freedoms	95.0
	5.2.2	Rule of law and personal freedoms	93.8
	5.2.3	Associational and organisational rights	100.0
	5.2.4	Experience of legal framework	88.6
	5.2.5	State effectiveness	77.4
5.3		Socio-cultural context	58.7
	5.3.1	Trust	14.5
	5.3.2	Tolerance	70.4
	5.3.3	Public spiritedness	91.2

APPENDIX V. CSI DATA MATRIX – TCC

<i>Sub-dimension</i>	<i>Ind.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Score</i>
1) Dimension: Civic Engagement			43.6
1.1		Extent of socially-based engagement	21.1
	1.1.1	Social membership 1	10.2
	1.1.2	Social volunteering 1	15.7
	1.1.3	Community engagement 1	37.4
1.2		Depth of socially-based engagement	70.4
	1.2.1	Social membership 2	34.1
	1.2.2	Social volunteering 2	93.7
	1.2.3	Community engagement 2	83.5
1.3		Diversity of socially-based engagement	34.3
	1.3.1	Diversity of socially-based engagement	34.3
1.4		Extent of political engagement	21.1
	1.4.1	Political membership 1	11.7
	1.4.2	Political volunteering 1	16.0
	1.4.3	Individual activism 1	35.7
1.5		Depth of political engagement	62.5
	1.5.1	Political membership 2	43.8
	1.5.2	Political volunteering 2	92.1
	1.5.3	Individual activism 2	51.7
1.6		Diversity of political engagement	51.9
	1.6.1	Diversity of political engagement	51.9
2) Dimension: Level of Organisation			50.5
2.1		Internal governance	96.6
	2.1.1	Management	96.6
2.2		Infrastructure	37.9
	2.2.1	Support organisations	37.9
2.3		Sectoral communication	74.3
	2.3.1	Peer-to-peer communication 1	76.9
	2.3.2	Peer-to-peer communication 2	71.6
2.4		Human resources	8.3
	2.4.1	Sustainability of human resources	8.3
2.5		Financial and technological resources	75.6
	2.5.1	Financial sustainability	76.1
	2.5.2	Technological resources	75.0
2.6		International linkages	10.6
	2.6.1	International linkages	10.6
3) Dimension: Practice of Values			50.9
3.1		Democratic decision-making governance	43.2
	3.1.1	Decision-making	43.2
3.2		Labour regulations	38.4
	3.2.1	Equal opportunities	35.2
	3.2.2	Members of labour unions	12.5
	3.2.3	Labour rights trainings	40.0
	3.2.4	Publicly available policy for labour standards	65.9
3.3		Code of conduct and transparency	76.3
	3.3.1	Publicly available code of conduct	70.5
	3.3.2	Transparency	82.1
3.4		Environmental standards	45.5

	3.4.1	Environmental standards	45.5
3.5		Perception of values in civil society as a whole	51.1
	3.5.1	Perceived non-violence	86.9
	3.5.2	Perceived internal democracy	52.5
	3.5.3	Perceived levels of corruption	14.0
	3.5.4	Perceived intolerance	26.5
	3.5.5	Perceived weight of intolerant groups	63.0
	3.5.6	Perceived promotion on non-violence and peace	63.9
4) Dimension: Perception of Impact			49.8
4.1		Responsiveness (internal perception)	57.1
	4.1.1	Impact on social concern 1	57.1
	4.1.2	Impact on social concern 2	57.1
4.2		Social impact (internal perception)	72.3
	4.2.1	General social impact	73.1
	4.2.2	Social impact of own organisation	71.4
4.3		Policy impact (internal perception)	42.6
	4.3.1	General policy impact	40.3
	4.3.2	Policy activity of own organisation	60.3
	4.3.3	Policy impact of own organisation	27.1
4.4		Responsiveness (external perception)	56.9
	4.4.1	Impact on social concern 1	55.2
	4.4.2	Impact on social concern 2	58.6
4.5		Social impact (external perception)	73.4
	4.5.1	Social impact selected concerns	90.0
	4.5.2	Social impact general	56.7
4.6		Policy impact (external perception)	30.4
	4.6.1	Policy impact specific fields 1-3	37.5
	4.6.2	Policy impact general	23.3
4.7		Impact of civil society on attitudes	16.2
	4.7.1	Difference in trust between civil society members and non-members	0.0
	4.7.2	Difference in tolerance levels between civil society members and non-members	8.8
	4.7.3	Difference in public spiritedness between civil society members and non-members	13.4
	4.7.4	Trust in civil society	42.6
5) Dimension: External Environment			70.4
5.1		Socio-economic context	81.6
	5.1.1	Basic Capabilities Index	99.2
	5.1.2	Corruption	64.0
5.2		Socio-political context	78.0
	5.2.1	Political rights and freedoms	85.0
	5.2.2	Rule of law and personal freedoms	77.0
	5.2.3	Associational and organisational rights	75.0
	5.2.4	Experience of legal framework	75.6
	5.2.5	State effectiveness	77.4
5.3		Socio-cultural context	51.5
	5.3.1	Trust	8.2
	5.3.2	Tolerance	49.7
	5.3.3	Public spiritedness	96.5

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